


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
THE ESSENTIALS OF EASTERN
PHILOSOPHY



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THE AUTHOR

THE ESSENTIALS *of* EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

*Being Two Addresses Delivered in
the University of Toronto at the
Philosophical Conference, 1922, by*

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With a Foreword by

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F. C. M. G., D. Litt., LL. D.

President of the University of Toronto

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TO

PROFESSOR G. S. BRETT, M.A. (OXON),
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO,

Whose lectures at Lahore aroused in me a living interest
in philosophy and provided me with an insight
which shaped the course of my career as
a teacher of philosophy,

THIS LITTLE BOOK IS DEDICATED
IN GRATITUDE AND ESTEEM.

FOREWORD

By SIR ROBERT FALCONER, K.C.M.G., D.Litt.
President of the University of Toronto

THE lectures here presented were originally delivered during a Conference on Philosophical Studies which was held at Toronto in 1922. I have been asked to write a few words of introduction to this volume, and I am glad to have this opportunity of referring to the valuable services rendered by the speakers whom we invited to address our students and the general public on that occasion.

The present century has seen a great advance in the development of internationalism as a conscious effort to overcome the antagonism between peoples and nations, and to increase the goodwill which comes from recognition of the common interests of mankind. Canada stands in a peculiarly favourable position for two reasons. It is closely related geographically to the United States with its enormous population of English-speaking people. At the same time it is connected racially and politically with the various units of the British Commonwealth of Nations, among which India is unique in respect of its great population and its traditional culture. A fortunate opportunity enabled Pro-

fessor Shastri to be present, together with three distinguished scholars from the United States, and this happy coincidence brought into direct contact the different minds of the East and the West.

The traditional view that East and West differ fundamentally is no longer accepted without qualification. The presence of a professor from the University of Calcutta in the lecture rooms of the University of Toronto, seems to suggest the need of some qualification, especially if we add that his lectures were given in English with the ease and fluency of one speaking his native tongue. The Royal Society in Great Britain now has several fellows who are natives of British India, and they bear witness to the enormous field of common subjects in which people of different races can meet with equality of understanding. On the other hand we may be thankful that this equality does not require the elimination of all differences. The social and economic conditions of the West are not so near perfection that improvement is impossible. The East has always sustained toward the facts and struggles of daily existence an attitude which is peculiarly contemplative. The East is the source from which the West draws its religious literature, and this fact should enable the western readers to appreciate the mood of eastern philosophy even if they take no excessive interest in the details. During the past century there has been a continuous and progressive interest in eastern thought, due partly to the work of western scholars in translating and elucidating eastern texts, and partly to a more generous estimate of the part played by the East in forming the

classical tradition which comes down to us from India and Egypt through Greece and Rome. The study of comparative religion has been specially effective in drawing attention to the literature of Hinduism and Buddhism.

Western students do not need to go far away from home to find themselves in the field of eastern thought. When they arrive there they will discover that the scene is unexpectedly familiar. They may have been led to suppose that all eastern writers talked a vague language concerned only with speculative idealism. But with the help of many excellent books recently published they will discover that atomism and materialism and logical realism all had their representatives.

While the earlier works were mainly British, such as those of Max Müller, the most recent and the most authoritative accounts of Indian thought are written by Indians who write excellent English, have their works published by English firms, and personally give the impression of being gentlemen of cosmopolitan habits. The differences between East and West are ceasing to be barriers that prevent understanding. As fresh elements in a civilisation that is struggling still toward higher levels, these very differences may well be valued and preserved as capable of enriching the world's store of culture.

In his addresses Professor Shastri has given a brief outline of Indian thought. He speaks as an Indian who has been trained in the best schools of India, in Oxford, and in the German school led by Deussen. He is well qualified to express the spirit of Indian philosophy to

western readers and we hope with Professor Shastri that this will be a contribution toward that more complete understanding which in the end will promote the social and political harmony of the world.

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LECTURE I

THE SPIRIT OF EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

THE ESSENTIALS OF EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

LECTURE I

THE SPIRIT OF EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

IT is with a sense of great delight and joy that I rise to address you tonight in response to the very kind invitation extended to me by the University of Toronto to take part in the Philosophical Conference. I hardly expected that the announcement of a public address on 'The Spirit of Eastern Philosophy' would receive such warm reception and enthusiastic welcome on your part as is evidenced by the large audience tonight. I can quite see that although you are supposed to be a very busy people, you have all the same not permitted your sense of philosophic inquisitiveness and the spirit of curiosity about higher truths to be smothered or stifled by more worldly interests. I think great credit is due to the Philosophy Department of the University of Toronto for having organised such a representative conference as this.¹

When I received your invitation to address this Conference, I was at New York, packing up and getting

* The speakers invited for this occasion were Professor Creighton (Cornell), Professor Hocking (Harvard), Professor Woodbridge (Columbia) and Professor P. D. Shastri (Calcutta).

ready to sail for England on my way back to India. But as I was desirous of seeing something of this great Dominion, and in full sympathy with the laudable scheme of promoting the advance of philosophic studies in this continent, I welcomed this opportunity of meeting and exchanging ideas with several distinguished scholars on this side of the water, and in particular of shaking hands once more after a long term of years with my former teacher, whose name is still cherished with a sense of profound respect and esteem in the University of Lahore—I mean Professor Brett—with whom, I believe, this excellent idea of holding a Philosophical Conference originated. I need hardly say how much I appreciate the privilege and honour of taking an active part in this Conference tonight.

Another reason why I welcome this opportunity of addressing you on a subject that seems to me to possess great importance to modern civilisation is that I have always stood for a better understanding between the East and the West. Without bringing about such a *rapprochement*, I believe there is not much hope for that international peace, harmony and goodwill, which we have always been most anxious to secure, but which none the less stands today after the War farther removed than ever before. The Great War has upset the fulcrum of the world's thought, thereby disturbing the whole equilibrium. The old order of thinking has perished, but a new order has not yet emerged. Everything seems to be in the melting pot. This is the time when a fresh inspiration and a message of hope should be most welcome. The narrow and artificial limits of

nationalism, which have gone along with so much selfishness and bigotry, must now be transcended; we have already passed through the stage of each country for itself and for none else. It is time that each country should direct its thoughts to the world as a whole, so that a new spirit of internationalism may wipe out the old shibboleth of nationalism, and then alone will humanity have a chance to revive the ideal of the brotherhood of man, which has been so vigorously taught by all great religions of the world, but which has all the same been no less vigorously defied and abandoned by the perverted understanding of its enemies of today. At the same time I feel optimistic enough to believe that the harmony of eastern and western thinkers will in the future remove much of the misunderstanding that is at the root of the spirit of distrust and estrangement that we find revealed today. It is thus with a view to offering a few observations on internationalism in culture and philosophy that I propose to address you tonight.

The philosophy of the East and the West has been directed into different channels and has assumed different lines of development in accordance with the peculiar temperament and tradition of each, and hardly any serious attempts have been made to compare notes, check results and come to a mutual understanding to pave the way for a truly universal philosophy. Barring one or two exceptional cases of Greek thinkers having come in touch with Indian culture and philosophy through Alexandria, there is very little evidence to show that the two exclusively divergent currents of thought

ever did come nearer each other. In modern times we can only recall the name of Schopenhauer, whom my revered *Guru*, the late Professor Paul Deussen, used to regard as the spiritual disciple of our great Shankara (who flourished about 1000 years before Schopenhauer), who was no doubt enamoured of the Vedānta philosophy and was deeply impressed with the loftiness and purity of Hindu Idealism, so far as he could gather it from a slipshod third-hand translation of the Upanishads. The doctrine of Māyā, which is the cornerstone of Shankara's Vedānta appealed to him in particular, as is obvious from several references to be found in his great work "*die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*." It was perhaps the legacy of the Upanishads, no less than Kant, that taught him to view the world *per se* as 'Will,' but as Māyā in its phenomenal aspect. In what is known as the modern philosophy of Europe, you find hardly any trace of a meeting of the East and the West. From Descartes down to the post-Hegelian thought of today, with the exception of Schopenhauer, there is no thinker that seems to have studied the results of eastern speculation as well, with the result that each propounded some imperfect and erroneous views in part, which might have been modified, if not altogether avoided, by utilising some of the results arrived at by eastern thinkers from a different standpoint and method. I had occasion to invite the attention of some well known European philosophers to this deplorable fact in my conversations with them more than a decade ago. For instance, I pointed it out to Professor Eucken at Jena,

Monsieur Bergson at Paris, Professor Höffding at Copenhagen, the late Professor Winderband at Heidelberg, and the late Monsieur Boutroux, when I met him at Bologna, and many others. They all agreed with me, but replied that they had to contend against the language-difficulty to understand eastern philosophical texts, and that very few works on the subject existed in European languages that could be called entirely trustworthy. I told them that Deussen had already achieved great success in presenting the secrets of eastern speculative thought to the western mind, and that he had been able to master Sanskrit so thoroughly as to be able to converse with me fluently when I had the pleasure of spending sometime with him at Kiel. You know how a good deal of the energy and intellect of scholars is being frittered away by working in mutual isolation. Although you have been successful in setting up a more or less perfect organisation to connect and collate the results of literary activity in various spheres, yet it is not quite enough, inasmuch as it practically ignores the East and its immense possibilities of enlightenment.

Why start with the prejudice that the East and the West can never meet, because of their inherent and vital differences of temperament, standpoint, and civilisation? Differences as such are not valueless, and consequently are not to be tabooed. A world without differences is unthinkable. Differences are an indication of life and struggle. You cannot wipe them out completely. What is wanted is that you should discover the underlying unity and uniformity that run through all differences.

Sometimes we are ourselves to blame for creating many artificial differences and divisions. The world's culture will always manifest itself in a number of differentiated types of civilisation. But that only shows that civilisation is working on with an "élan vitale." In this world there is no single event that could, in an absolute sense, repeat itself, no two things are quite alike, why, even twins are not 'doubles' but develop very marked differences. But nature remains a systematic unity. Humanity is a unity. Multifarious tribes, nations, and races may inhabit the globe, but their unity is realised in their humanity. Assuming that creation was an event in time, the world was never created in the water-tight compartments of the East and the West, with their sharp distinctions and differences, but it was a totality, a unity perforated with variety, and rolling on in time.

The synthesis of eastern and western thought that I advocate does not imply any surrender of their respective standpoints or methods on either side; each should be free to develop along its own lines without any sense of estrangement from the other. You must not lose sight of the essential unity underlying all plurality. The many alone is meaningless and does not constitute knowledge without centring on a synthetic unity, while the one too is empty and contentless without the concrete life of the many. The East and the West should be viewed as mutually complementary. Each should pursue its own ideal on its own lines in the light of its own culture, none the less the central unity of the world's thought should not be lost sight of. I hold no brief for either type of thought, and as a neutral student

of universal philosophy and culture I shall now indicate very briefly the general attitude of the East towards the West, and *vice versa*, and then shall make an attempt to reveal the inner spirit of eastern philosophy, taking only its principal type, the philosophy of the Hindus, that has come down to us in an unbroken tradition of ages in the past.

Now, let me first give you an idea as to how we in the East are accustomed to view your speculative thought of the West. In the first place, we are struck by your over-emphasis on individualism. In dealing with the minute details of a part you generally lose sight of the whole, and thus your science is divided into numerous branches apparently independent of each other in matter as well as method. Very seldom is your attention called to the underlying and essential synthesis of these various expressions of the human spirit. This is quite natural, since your last court of appeal is the intellect, and the intellect can study a subject only piecemeal, and it employs the analytical method of enquiry to extend the range of knowledge. Of your life, it is only the present that really matters, maybe there is a future to think of, but no past. Thus you hypostatise the present, and fail to connect the present life with the past lives, since you don't believe in transmigration, in the eternally moving wheel of birth and death. Make the best of your present life without worrying yourself about the past or very much about the future is the general expression of people's belief and attitude in the West. In fact very few would perhaps have time enough, in the midst of their money-making hustle, to think calmly

as to whence came man and whither he goes. Such questions are thrown aside as an idle luxury, since they do not serve any useful purpose. What doesn't contribute to bread and butter is not worth bothering about. In the East, however, you find an entirely different picture. Every student of Hindu metaphysics approaches his preceptor with the following problems at the very outset: Am I free or in bondage? If in bondage, how does this necessity come about? Wherein is such bondage rooted? How can I attain freedom? What is the 'I,' and what is the 'not-I'? How to distinguish the two? To these queries you will perhaps apply the pragmatic test and say that they are not worth bothering about, and what do we gain even if we could solve them? Similarly the problem of the beginning and end of human existence is to you not worth bothering about. This I say is the typical way of dealing with suchlike questions, which pragmatically may be worthless to you but which are of a paramount importance to us. We are taught to view our life as a whole, as an unbroken continuum of the past, present, and future. Hence our belief in 'Karma' helps us to a very great extent in reconciling us to our lot. I shall have occasion to speak of the doctrine of Karma later. While the principle of causation has taught you to view existence as a vast network of phenomena, linked up by an unbroken chain of necessary laws, you somehow do not pay sufficient attention to the fact of life in its entirety. For that reason the average man in the West thinks mostly of a good meal, smart clothes, plenty of money, with an ever-increasing anxiety to earn more and more money.

A life spent in comfort and luxury if possible is his ambition. Such ambition is no good substitute for an aspiration after higher things, things of a higher value, things whose possession satisfies not only the cravings of the body but of the spirit as well.

Another thing that we cannot help noticing is that you in the West usually lay too much stress on proof and the rigid rules of logic. You are always anxious to submit every problem to the test of reason and ratiocination, with the consequence that you have always to cling only to the external aspect of reality, without ever being able to have a dip into its inmost core. Your rationalism incapacitates you perhaps for dealing with such abiding problems as, for instance, the Absolute, the life immortal, the free causality of reason, freedom, the Self, and so on. You seem to be labouring under the impression that the intellect provides you with a master-key to the solution of every problem. But there are problems that soar above the flight of the intellect; there are problems against which the intellect strikes repeatedly without any avail; there are problems which refuse to be chopped up into bits by the sharp edge of your intellectual blade; there are problems that completely baffle the intellect with all its notions, concepts, and reasons.

Kant fully recognised this fact in his own way, and the positive side of his work, which demanded further thought, was completed by Schopenhauer. Kant's "Ideas of Reason" are beyond the grasp of the intellect; Pure Speculative Reason is unable to deal with them. They exist in a different territory, that of Pure Practical

Reason, and are merely regulative principles, and offer justification for the existence of moral faith. You know that the intellect is only a part, and by no means the greater part, of the totality of our life; feeling and will have a greater scope for their operation and exercise. Bergson has told you how the intellect, instead of guiding us aright, leads us astray by presenting to us a completely distorted picture of reality. He has also told you that it is Intuition alone that can give us a true view of reality. Thus you find the same truth emerging in different settings. But it is not Bergson's mysticism that is particularly appreciated in the West. To us, however, that part of his philosophy appeals most. I shall speak of mysticism presently; but please don't misunderstand me. I am not speaking of eastern philosophers as if they entirely discarded all intellectual scrutiny, analysis, and proof. On the other hand, like the ancient Greeks, we in India still hold occasional assemblies, where philosophers are invited from all over the country, mostly those who have not studied western philosophy and languages, but have devoted a quarter of a century, if not more, to an intensive specialisation in a branch of Hindu philosophy through the medium of Sanskrit. Many Sanyāsis and Sādhus in their saffron garments also take part in these discussions. The sitting continues for many a long hour, and is sometimes centred about the definition of a term. Whatever definition is proposed by one side is condemned by the other on the basis of argument alone. The discussion begins by reiterating the well known dialectic principle that the establishment of a thesis is

based on definition and proof, and not on mere dogmatic statement, as they say in Sanskrit—

“*Lakshanapramāṇābhyām vastusiddhiḥ,
na hi pratijñāmātrena.*”

On such occasions the handling of some of the most subtle intricacies of Logic brings into evidence their profound and thorough knowledge, a very sharp critical acumen and a very retentive memory. References are sometimes made to several texts, all quoted from memory, which are so complicated in their elaborate style and language that even with a philosophic tradition and training we find them very difficult to explain, not to speak of any western orientalist having access to them. But these meetings are all right as an occasional exercise in mental gymnastics. These hair-splitting discussions, apart from their own intrinsic worth, are on the whole futile, inasmuch as the higher problems of Life and Existence always refuse to be presented in dialectic moulds. It is only to a pure heart that Reality reveals itself as Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. To the cold intellect these forms will ever appear as ‘robes of darkness,’ and it will never be able to penetrate to them. The intellect can never explain Reality; Reality will explain itself; it is a self-illuminating thing. Truth always challenges us to discover it, Goodness always challenges us to achieve it, and Beauty always challenges us to create it—but the intellect, unaided by Intuition, comes forward with high-sounding pretensions and accepts the challenge, only to discover its utter helplessness later on.

I don't imply that you should look upon the intellect as an enemy; what is desired is that you should be perfectly aware of the legitimate sphere in which it can be of help to you. Take the problem of God. Can you ever strictly *prove* the existence of God? But that by no means implies that all our attempted proofs have no value whatsoever. In spite of Kant's rejection of the three traditional proofs for the existence of God, which is, of course, justified from the standpoint of Pure Speculative Reason, we are not prepared to ignore the value and utility of these arguments, howsoever logically imperfect they be. Intellect and Intuition have each their legitimate functions to perform; we must give each its dues. The difficulty arises when either oversteps the territory marked for it, and treads on an alien soil.

I now pass on to another feature of the western philosophy. It appears to us that you take only an abstract interest in your study of philosophy, that you cut it off from your experience of everyday life, that is to say, you divorce philosophy from actual life. You approach the problems of philosophy in the same academic spirit in which you approach those of physics, biology, botany, etc. You seem to analyse a philosophical problem in the same way as you dissect the membranes of a frog. You do not allow your whole personality, in particular your feelings and will, to be coloured by your philosophical studies. This sort of disinterestedness may perhaps be justified as being in accordance with the 'scientific' spirit, but it creates an undesirable cleft between theory and practice. Men like Tolstoy, whose life embodies their doctrines, are very rare. Eucken has

delivered his inspiring message to you during the past decade or more so vigorously, speaking of an activism that is based on the discovery of a spiritual life within you. In one of the addresses he delivered at Oxford about ten years ago, he expounded very beautifully the relation between Religion and Life. After listening to the address I began to wonder if he had not imbibed something of the spirit of our ancient Rishis and the vision of our exalted souls, the Mahātmās! He advanced the thesis that in this life it *was* possible to rise above merely human existence, that we could if we would discern in it the activity and manifestation of a power at once encompassing and transcending the world. The life of the spirit manifests itself in the progress of civilisation, and the products it brings forth, *viz.*, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, rise into a realm of inwardness, into a sphere which exists for itself and in itself.

Today in India, too, we are becoming more and more worldly in our ideas and ideals, more and more given to blind imitation of western ideas and manners, more and more deficient in spontaneity of thought and originality of views, more and more dependent upon others' work and labours, more and more averse to that life of the spirit (*ādhyātmika jīvana*), which used to be the fountain of inestimable joy and bliss to us! The oriental mind has lost a considerable amount of its freedom of expression, owing also to its contact with western culture. Such contact has proved both a blessing and a curse. In spite of all that, the fact remains that even today, more than in any other country in the world, you

find in India the life of most people guided by some of the ancient ideals of our religious philosophy. Almost everyone practises some sort of a cultus, which to him presents the spiritual life in a visible form.

To us a philosopher is not a dialectician, or a profound scholar, or a popular teacher, but one who hungers after spiritual insight, who is ever trying to reflect his knowledge and beliefs in his life and deeds, who, although taking part in all the joys and activities of the world, nurtures within him a spirit of withdrawal, a spirit of detachment and meditation, who tries to penetrate to the core of reality, who endeavours to see beyond, to see through, and to enter the heart of reality, who is not much affected by pleasure and pain, and leading a life of purity and love, practises as well as he can the cardinal virtues advocated by the Shāstras. Our philosophers have been Rishis in the past. This word 'Rishi' is derived from the root 'drś,' which means 'to see,' hence a Rishi is a 'seer,' and not a mere 'thinker.'¹ We may become the finest and the acutest logicians, acquire an encyclopædic knowledge of all sciences, but if we fail to act up to our ideas and live up to our ideals, if we fail to realise the truth that we have learnt, if we fail to embody our thoughts into our conduct, if we fail to bridge over the chasm yawning between our words and deeds—in vain is all that knowledge; we are like beasts of burden carrying a heavy load of sandal-wood!

Reverting to our main point, let us now pass on to another characteristic of the western thought, as it

¹ So "Theory" is from a Greek word "to see" or "to view": the "theoretical" man (theorêtikos) is "the man that has vision" [G.S.B.].

strikes us in the East. The study of philosophy in the West is more objective than introspective and subjective. This is quite natural, keeping in view the fact that your sciences are mainly based on the objective and experimental method. None can take any serious objection to the employment of this method; what is questioned is its being made use of exclusively, and even stretched so far as to apply it to those problems of psychology and metaphysics, which can only be adequately viewed by introspection. Moreover, students learn philosophy as one of the many subjects of the curriculum, mostly with a view to qualify themselves for a degree, and not because they have any desire to discover truth, or to enter the higher kingdom of the spirit by the guidance and illumination philosophy may be able to provide them with. They see all kinds of suffering and entanglement in the world, but beyond the general idea of social service, which appeals to only a small number as a duty, they are not led to think as to whether it is possible to get rid of this suffering and rise above all entanglements, and whether philosophy can help them in discovering that higher life, which at once constitutes and transcends the world. One consequence of pursuing the study of philosophy in this spirit, or of ignoring the study altogether, is that the majority of people look upon religion as nothing more than a set of dogmas and rites. They fail to see that these dogmas and rites are absolutely hollow and meaningless if they are not impregnated with the spiritual life. A man is not religious simply because he regularly attends a church-service on every Sunday or takes part in some other con-

gregation. Such observances have their value only as auxiliaries of the spiritual life, of which they are the servants, and they are by no means the substitute for that religiosity or religious experience, which is the essential factor. In India our whole philosophy is tinged with religion, and the problem as to whether philosophy is related to religion does not emerge for us. To us philosophy divorced from religion loses all significance. All our systems of philosophy are religious in spirit, since they aim at the building up of a '*Lebensanschauung*,' whereby we may obtain freedom from bondage and suffering.

Here you might confront me with a question. You might say that if according to Hindu philosophy each person is called upon to work out his own salvation or freedom from suffering, there will be no room for social service. But the answer is simple enough. What higher ideal of social service could you conceive than the one based on the Vedantic truth that we could love humanity because it is essentially an expression of the same 'ātman' (self) which is within us, nay that we should be kind and merciful even to the dumb animals, since we should perceive the same self pervading everywhere. Merely being told that I should love my neighbour as myself is not enough: a reason must also be stated. I can love my neighbour as myself, only if I feel convinced that he is no other than myself, that in him is the same 'atman' that is within me, that barring the self-imposed limitations of space and time, which are due to '*avidyā*' or '*māyā*,' there is no difference between his being and mine. If this principle is accepted as the

criterion of conduct, where, then, I ask, is any room for selfishness and hostility?

So much for the present on the criticism of western philosophy: let us now see what the West has to say in criticism of our eastern philosophy. In the first place, it is pointed out, that some of the eastern ideas, such as that of renunciation, offer no solution to the problems of life and are radically opposed to the spirit of activity, which appeals to the western mind as forming the very essence of life. We are not born to lead a life of idle thought and abstract meditation, but to work and act for the good of humanity and for our own good, and to put a bold front to the sufferings and trials of this life rather than run away to the forest, renouncing all worldly interest and pleasure. Activity is the very soul of life, and any philosophy that emphasises the idea of renunciation offers no comfort and solace, and cannot appeal to the western mind.

This sounds quite convincing at first, but on a closer examination you will find that the charge is based on an imperfect understanding of the meaning of renunciation.

According to our religious philosophy, although the ultimate goal is the same, *viz.* freedom from bondage, yet there are various paths leading to it, mutually interconnected. The particular path to be recommended to anyone depends upon his fitness, upon his previous qualifications and merits. Even if he starts on the lowest rung of the ladder that leads to perfection, he can climb up slowly by degrees. There is no one way recommended to everybody, irrespective of his spiritual

qualifications. The Vedas may be viewed in this light as speaking of the three main paths to freedom from pain and the attainment of salvation. These are *Karma* (action), *Bhakti* or *Upāsana* (meditation), and *Jñāna* (knowledge). Each of these three constitutes a 'Yoga,' that is, a science that teaches us the means to the realisation of our union with God. The great majority of people are only fit for the first kind, and some for the second kind of Yoga, but very few are really competent to perform the third kind, *i.e.* the *Jñāna*-Yoga, which does not consist in the mere thoughtful discrimination and its attendant requisites, but in the practical realisation of the truths; and although many may undertake to run along the path of discrimination, most of them will halt before seriously taking to the practical side in the realisation of the truths taught in the Upanishads and the accepted systems of Hindu philosophy.

Now, renunciation ("vairāgya") is a *sine qua non* to all Yoga, *i.e.* the spirit of renunciation should pervade all the three kinds of our spiritual activity. It is, however, of particular importance to the third kind. There not only the mere spirit of renunciation is necessary but a much more intensive kind of recoil from the world, when one actually undertakes the realisation of truth through that highest path. Renunciation has been considered in its four aspects, *viz.* (1) *Mrdu Vairāgya*; this is the mildest kind, and means that feeling of recoil from the worldly objects which comes after the realisation of the fact that these objects do not give us the pleasure that we want: at this stage the longing for something higher is only vague and indistinct, although

you do feel it all the same; (2) *Madhyama Vairāgya*; this is the middling type, and means that feeling which arises in your mind for the attainment of a higher perfection, when the world appears stale, insipid and hollow to you; (3) *Adhimātra Vairāgya*; this is the next higher stage, differing from the previous one in intensity, and (4) *Parā Vairāgya*: this is the highest stage of renunciation, and in it the mind completely turns away from the worldly objects, without returning to a sense of its illusory contact with them.

The first three kinds of renunciation greatly purge and purify the soul from all the dross that clings to it through "avidyā" and qualify one for the "Savikalpa-Samādhi," in which the sense of duality is not entirely lost at certain times, but the fourth kind of renunciation fits one for practising the "Nirvikalpa-Samādhi," which is the highest type of meditation and in which the mind even after the performance of the *samādhi* does not return to the sense of duality. This last stage may be attained by perhaps one in a million these days.

You will thus see that renunciation has a *raison d'être* of its own in the complete scheme of Hindu religious philosophy. Now consider the question as to the spirit of renunciation making us unfit to share and partake of the pleasures of this world. Let us first analyse this objection. It speaks of the pleasures of the world. Those to whom they form the *summum bonum* need not and will not care for the spirit of renunciation at all. Such people exist in every country and in all ages. The Greek Cyrenaics and after them the Epicureans and then the modern Hedonists all speak of pleasure as the high-

est end, but even there, if you will compare the ideas with those of the Epicureans, you will find that the latter distinctly took a higher view, inasmuch as they did not care so much for momentary pleasure, pleasure of the present moment without any thought of the future consequences, but aimed at a more abiding pleasure. My point is that with every such quest after the discovery of something higher and more abiding is associated a kind of mental recoil from that which does not satisfy you, and that is the genesis of the spirit of renunciation. Further, I maintain this kind of a mental recoil is the very basis for a search for the higher life of the spirit. Without such withdrawal or recoil there will be no incentive to a personal interest in the problems of the religious consciousness. All great religions of the world have originated in this sense of recoil or renunciation. All great religious teachers have borne testimony to this fact. Not only Confucius, Mahāvīra and Buddha, but Jesus also distinctly spoke of the spirit of renunciation. St. Paul makes it a necessary step to the realisation of oneness with Christ. The ascetic ideal of Jesus' teaching seems to have been cast aside by the anti-Christian world of today. He never spoke of our losing ourselves entirely in the pleasures of the world, but advocated that while our body cannot help being in the world our spirit should rise beyond, that being in the world we ought to be above the world, that unless we are reborn by a spiritual regeneration, we cannot enter the Kingdom of God.

The life of the spirit is an experience, it is a realisation, a life to be lived, and not an abstract notion.

Renunciation is decidedly a real help towards the attainment of this life. What our philosophy advocates is a renunciation in spirit, and not the running away to a forest and inflicting all kinds of torture on the body. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* emphatically advocates the performance of duty above everything else, and repudiates no less the life of idleness led by many 'sādhus' and others, who entirely misunderstand the import of renunciation. It says, for instance,

"Niyatam kuru karma tvam
Karma jyāyo hy akarmanah."

This means that the duties connected with one's station in life must be performed, because a life of activity is superior to that of inactivity. Further it is said that duty must be performed for its own sake, and not with a view to gain a personal or other end; in other words, it should be performed in the spirit of "disinterestedness" ("nishkāmakarma"). Surely that is the same thing as the performance of duty in the spirit of renunciation. This is thought to be very necessary because it is our attachment to actions and their results which leads to our bondage. Our senses are like wayward horses leading us astray and are extremely difficult to control. The mind is led away by them through various desires and impulses, and they run so very fast as to make it very difficult to pull them up by the rein. The *Smṛtis* extol right conduct as the highest duty or the highest religion ("ācārah paramo dharmah"), and of the fourfold purpose of life, 'duty' ("Dharma") stands first (the remaining three being "artha," "kāma," and

“moksha”). The householder’s life, instead of being condemned, has the highest dignity and respect attached to it. A householder, who carries out his duties faithfully and in the right spirit, is even superior to a saint (“sanyāsi”), who has retired to a life in the forest.

With this is connected the idea of the annihilation of desire, which Buddha preached as the corner-stone of the spiritual life or “nirvāna.” Desire is in sooth our greatest enemy. It is desire which is responsible for our suffering and bondage, for our repeated births and deaths on the “wheel of transmigration” (“samsāra-cakra”). It is desire that always disturbs our spiritual equilibrium; it is desire that leads us astray from the holy life of endless bliss and perfection; it is desire, with its consequent unfulfillment, that is responsible not only for our individual worries, anxieties and sins, but also for a diseased national mentality and national and political catastrophes. You might say that human life is not worth living without the satisfaction of desires, that a life without desires would be like the body without the soul, and that you are not prepared to transform yourselves into mere colourless and abstract persons, that a life of the pure universal is a life of the zero-point and is meaningless. I know very well that it is very difficult to convince you of the truth of Buddha’s idea, which pervades the whole of Hindu Idealistic philosophy, and that unless you are seriously on the way to an unfolding of the spiritual life within you, you will not appreciate the idea of cutting down your desires. Western civilisation is, in fact, the deification of desire.

But you will see that in your everyday life, whenever you find your interests clash or your desires coming into a conflict, you have to make a choice, and right choice is governed by a will to attain the higher ideal. The lower universe of desires is thus surrendered to the higher, and in that case we say that our deliberation is morally justifiable, since it has made the right choice. It requires only a further movement beyond this stage of moral deliberation to be convinced of the illusoriness and deceptiveness of desires. The life of desire and impulse is a life of mere sensibility; it is the assertion of the animal within us. It offers us the smoothest path to tread upon; it is the line of least resistance, and is like sliding downhill without any effort. But it usually happens that that which is very sweet in the beginning is bitter in the end. Of the courses open to us, if we choose the "agreeable" ("preya"), it will give us the greatest satisfaction in the beginning, but the results would be far from desirable; but if we choose the "good" ("śreya") it may involve struggle and difficulties in the beginning, but the consequences would be most welcome. Anyway, the vanity of desires has been preached by many a great teacher of the world. Buddha's ideal of a complete annihilation of desire is altogether superhuman, and requires perhaps several lives to complete the task once begun. But a first real step towards this highest goal is the *organisation* of desire, whereby you root out the unholy desires and bring together into a system those that are holy and contribute towards facilitation of the *summum bonum*, transforming in this way the bad into the good desire

or eliminating the bad altogether, if possible. To overcome a strong desire is like walking on the sharp edge of a razor. The best way to begin the rooting out of desires is to organise them into a rational whole at first. We must not be under the delusion that the satisfaction of a desire makes it disappear: no, it rather invigorates it; it then attacks you with redoubled force; its edge is sharpened by passing through the stage of satisfaction. That to get rid of a desire we must allow it to die a natural death in its own satisfaction, is an idea that is based on an entirely erroneous psychology. The satisfaction of a desire is adding fuel to fire: to use a Sanskritic metaphor, it is like pouring clarified butter on fire, which makes the flames to rise up still higher with a roaring impetuosity. It is for this reason that you find in Hindu philosophy a repeated emphasis on the spirit of renunciation, on the life of withdrawal of the mind from sense-objects ("nivr̥tti"). Schopenhauer speaks of this as the "will to deny" ("der verneinende Wille"). For overcoming all misery and pain of the world, he, too, recommended a contemplative attitude towards the world as the great step towards a complete breaking of the Will to Live ("der lebendige Wille"), without which a real emancipation could not be brought about.

Renunciation does not mean the deadening of all activity. Renunciation is in itself another kind of activity, and we have no right to limit the meaning of 'activity' to the mere body or the outer world. There is a higher kind of activity, which appears as 'inactivity' to those engrossed in the life of the lower self, and who find it

so hard to turn their gaze inwards and discover in the spiritual life within the fountainhead of all true activity. The outer life of the senses is quite natural to us, while it needs a great effort to subdue the senses and look within: this idea has been symbolically expressed in the *Katha Upanishad*, which says:

“*Parāñci khāni vyatṛnat Svayambhūb
Tasmāt parān paśyati na antar ātmā.*”

This means that after creating man, the Creator turned the faces of the sense outwards; consequently, it is quite natural that the soul looks outwards towards things rather than inwards towards itself. The modern world is looking outwards rather too much: it is only the life of the senses, what we call the “*Pravṛtti-mārga*” which appeals to it in particular. Such a life is devitalised of spirituality. In modern times, man’s life seems to be torn asunder by illegitimate ambition, individually and collectively, eaten up by egotism, jealousy, and discord, and being restless owing to its spiritual impoverishment, hungers after peace and tranquility, yearns after that enlightenment whereby the hollowness and artificiality of the present-day materialistic civilisation will cease to have any spell of enchantment for it. But this will never come so long as there is no radical change in the very standpoint from which we view life and its meaning and ideals, in the angle of vision itself, in the very change of heart. The grim and the harrowing spectacle of the Great War reminds us of the same truth in letters of blood: he who has eyes may read it. Millions of lives have been sacrificed, millions of homes have been

robbed of their bread-winners and their domestic happiness, millions of widows and orphans are cursing those who, maddened by their boundless and pretentious ambitions and national edification, dignity and prestige, allowed the spirit of War to sweep away the flower of humanity in Europe! In spite of this colossal sacrifice at the altar of Moloch, Europe will not be happier than before. The way in which European politics is being shaped after the War leaves hardly any doubt in my mind that there is yet to be another War within a quarter of a century, which will practically annihilate European civilisation. We are forced to call this civilisation soulless, unspiritual, irreligious, and artificial. It badly stands in need of a more intimate appreciation of the ideals of Peace, Harmony, and Good Will, which can only be realised in a universe where national ambition is not allowed an unlimited scope, where patriotism is shown to have outlived its utility and become more or less an anachronism, where each country learns to view its own problems as world-problems, where the spirit of distrust and espionage has vanished along with all its secret treaties, where there is a genuine recoil from the life of mere externalism and vanity, where our actions are spiritualised in the atmosphere of renunciation and sympathy, and where all petty human aims are sacrificed in the interests of the Whole, a higher Power, a Power that will at once give us a sense of the security of a real achievement. This spirit alone could create a religion of humanity, which, if lived up to, will go a long way to impart a new life and soul to all culture, and thereby pave the way for the establishment and

realisation of a Universal Religion, a Universal Culture, and a Universal Philosophy.

Let me now come to the second charge that is usually preferred against eastern philosophy. It is said that Hindu philosophy is clouded over with a nebulous mysticism, and lacks clear-cut ideas, definite concepts, and scientific methods. In reply to this let me first make it clear that the existence of mysticism in any philosophical thought does not necessarily betray any inherent weakness. Wherever an honest attempt has been made to unravel the mystery of the relation of the One and the Many, mysticism seems to be the final answer called forth by the break-down of the intellect. Mysticism appears in Greek philosophy in Socrates and Plato, and later on in Neo-Platonism. The best thoughts of Philo on the relation of God to the world are all deeply tinged with mysticism. St. Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Jacob Boehme, then again Goethe, Wordsworth, Tennyson, Browning, as also Swedenborg, Tolstoy, and no less the two great exponents of modern thought, I mean Eucken and Bergson—all of them are mystics to a greater or smaller extent. Persian philosophy, too, culminated in the mysticism of the Sufis. In Indian philosophy mysticism can be traced back to some of the Vedic hymns, and more prominently in the earlier Upanishads. The essential doctrine of the Upanishads reappears in the Bhagavadgītā. Then again, Shankara, the greatest Vedantic teacher of India, was a mystic beyond all doubt, as also were the later exponents of the Bhakti school. There is, therefore, no doubt that mysticism finds a prominent place in our

eastern thought, but it is not because we have no definite conceptions and exact ideas, but only because the subject baffles all intellectual attempts at a solution. Could you name to me even a single philosopher who has succeeded in solving the ultimate metaphysical problems on purely intellectual grounds? Has even Hegel, with all his high-sounding pretensions, been able to come to any satisfactory solution with the aid of the intellect alone? In his philosophy of art, he seems to me to be a mystic of the first order, although in his philosophy of the mind he has been attacking mysticism. I believe that our main contribution to international philosophy lies to a very great extent in our rich mysticism. Mysticism, if viewed from without, will always appear as a nebulous confusion of thought, but judged from within it appears as the light of a living faith. The Upanishads speak of the Absolute as indefinable:

“Yato vāco nivartante
Aprāpya manasā saha.”

This means that the Absolute is that whence the speech turns back, failing to reach it along with the mind. That which thought cannot grasp, that which the mind cannot conceive, that which baffles all description in language, is a pure *experience*, and mysticism is only the nearest description of such experience. The value of such experience must not, therefore, be judged by standards which have no validity in their application to it.

This gives you very briefly a general idea of the dif-

ferences of the two types of thought in their external aspects, *i.e.* as they appear to the critic from the outside. In a way, I have already indirectly introduced you to the spirit of eastern philosophy by what I have said so far. I shall now supplement this introduction with a picture of the inner spirit of eastern philosophy, which culminates in the idealistic monism of the Hindus.

The basic principle of our philosophy is the candid recognition of the limitations of the intellect. We believe that the intellect, although a very sharp weapon to deal with empirical problems, is none the less a very uncouth instrument to deal with the problems of metaphysics. Kant rightly emphasised the same truth in western thought. Our knowledge cannot transcend experience. He set forth the limits of human experience under his four *a priori* Principles of the Understanding, *viz.* the Axiom of Intuition, the Anticipation of Perception, the Analogies of Experience, and the Postulates of Empirical Thought. Our knowledge cannot overstep these limits. This at once brings out the futility of all attempts towards an intellectual knowledge of the ultimate problems, such as those of God, Freedom, and Immortality. Through the door of intellect we know only appearances, and to grasp Reality we must knock at another door, that is, of the Pure Practical Reason or Faith—what we would call *Śraddhā* in Sanskrit. Knowledge must make room for faith. That which knows of no logical demonstration or proof is held fast as the basis of a higher life, call it the moral or even better the spiritual life. It is the sphere of *Śraddhā*—the Will to Believe, which is a mysterious

creative force. Faith is not inferior to knowledge, but is a higher form of certainty. This is what Kant took pains to explain, but what most of your philosophers have rejected, as is evidenced by the post-Kantian degeneration of thought in the West.

Truth can never be comprehended in the moulds of logic, but can only be "seen" or "felt." All knowledge is ultimately based on intuition. Nobody can "prove" the existence even of the 'self.' Descartes' '*cogito, ergo sum*' entirely breaks down if treated as a syllogism, but possesses a distinctive value as an intuition, an irresistible certainty. So, too, the Sāṅkhya-sūtra—

"Asti ātma nāstirva-sādhana-asambhavāt"

which attempts to prove the existence of the 'self' by saying that the self exists, because it is impossible to disprove it, cannot be treated as a syllogism. The true validity of the idea of the self centres round our *intuition*; we can perceive the existence of the self by our spiritual insight. When we affirm that we cannot "see" the self, we merely mean that the self cannot be perceived in space like other material objects, but the whole presupposition is gratuitous. We have a perception of our ideas, which are not in space but in time alone. If ideas can thus be perceived as ours, why cannot we rise a step higher and perceive the percipient self? As the Upanishads declare: "By what shall we know him, through whom everything becomes known? By what shall we know the knower?" Surely not by ratiocination, not by a chain of syllogistic arguments, not by wrangling, not by hair-splitting discussions, but by silent meditation on that which is within you all, and yet in

whose quest you knock about from place to place without ever finding him anywhere outside. Isn't it a wonderful illusion that we should know the phenomenal world through the self, and yet doubt the very existence of the self itself?

Spinoza spoke of viewing the world "*sub specie æternitatis*" in order to free ourselves from the imperfections of evil and to discover the underlying essence of individual things in Substance. He told you that our knowledge cannot be adequate except in so far as it is determined by the idea of the Whole, which alone can give us an all-embracing unity, and in which alone all parts fit together, all imperfections vanish, all manifestations merge into a unity to form one universal life permeated by the Eternal, Infinite, Indivisible, Timeless Substance. How can we have such an idea of the Whole? Only by Intuition. And this feeling of our oneness with the Eternal is the soul of all religion. You have this thought beautifully expounded by Schleiermacher, who said, "If man does not become one with the eternal in the immediate unity of his intuition and feeling, he remains eternally separated from it in the derived unity of consciousness. . . . Offer reverently with me a lock to the manes of the holy, rejected Spinoza!" As a great admirer of Spinoza, Schleiermacher opened up the rich fountain of mysticism. In the first volume of his *Philosophy of Religion*, Pfeiderer quotes a long passage, purported to have been written by Herder to Jacobi in 1784 in appreciation of Spinoza's mysticism. Jacobi was taken to task both by Herder and Goethe for having misunderstood Spinoza. Goethe wrote in 1786, "You say we can only believe in God; but I would

have you to know that I am strongly for seeing. Spinoza speaks of the scientific intuition. . . ." Thus you see how religion is truly conceived as a matter of immediate experience, a life to be lived, and not a set of theological dogmas. The method of concepts is quite fruitless here. Herbart tried this method in the belief that philosophy worked through the elaboration of sober concepts, but found in the end that logic was helpless in giving us any knowledge of God, and that Faith was older than Science and Morals. Now look at his opponent, Schopenhauer, and see what he says. He held that instead of concepts, it was *intuition* through which philosophy worked. Kant had said that the "Ding-an-sich" was unknowable by the intellect as Pure Reason, but Schopenhauer added that it could be known through *Intuition*. Now turn to the other side and look at Hegel once more. He stands in a sharp contrast to Schopenhauer in philosophical speculation. He found a very convenient catchword "inner necessity," which he freely made use of, when no explanation was forthcoming. Although he named his philosophy as Absolute Idealism, he was in fact a Realist, who returned to pre-Kantian Dogmatism in his assumption of a complete identity of the 'real' and the 'rational.' His philosophy of nature, based on his dialectic method, in which thought proceeds in *triads*, is no less arbitrary and fantastic than that of Schelling. Hegelianism, kicked out of its home in Germany, met with an eager welcome in Britain, perhaps because its vigorous but elusive intellectualistic realism appeals more to the mind of the matter-of-fact British people.

I feel convinced that the progress of modern science will serve to deepen more and more our sense of mystery, and it is there that Intuition will have to illumine our path. It is only in the "exoteric" knowledge ("aparā vidyā") that our intellect can be of use to us, but in the true "esoteric" knowledge ("parā vidyā") Intuition alone can guide us. Croce expresses the same truth in his contention that every object may be known under two characters, as a work of 'science' and as a work of 'art.' Corresponding to these, there are two kinds of knowledge, *viz.* intellectual (or logical) and intuitive.

Throughout Hindu philosophy runs the conviction — 40 that the final solution of the ultimate problems will ever remain a mystery to the understanding. Beyond pointing out the illegitimacy of the question itself, nobody can tell us why the world was created. Any answer given is full of difficulties. One might further ask, was this a motivated or unmotivated act of creation? If there was a motive behind it, this would imply that God was lacking in perfection in so far as the motive had to be realised in an act of creation; if, on the other hand, God created the world without any motive, it is tantamount to saying that his activity was a purposeless activity, which means, in other words, that he was a mad creator! In such cases, the advice offered by the author of the *Pancadaśī* seems to be quite wholesome: he says—

"Acintyāḥ khalu ye bhāvāḥ
Na tān tarkeshu yojayet,
Acintya-racanā-rūpam
Manasā api jagat khalu."

That is to say, we must not attempt a merely logical explanation of ideas and problems that baffle the understanding; for instance, the arrangement and form of the world is itself a problem that cannot be adequately dealt with by the mind! Who can explain the mysterious growth of the tree from the seed? Is the tree in the seed or the seed in the tree? Even the fact of the birth and death of human beings cannot be explained adequately. It is a great enigma. A mere reference to a number of empirical or secondary laws of nature is no explanation. In the Mahābhārata you find one of the greatest wonders stated like this:

“Ahani ahani bhūtāni
Gacchanti yama-mandiram,
Śashāḥ sthiratvam ichhanti
Kim āścaryam ataḥ param.”

This means that you observe every day human beings die and pass on to the next world, yet those who are still alive forget this very fact and behave as if they wish to live in this world for ever—what greater wonder than this could you conceive! It is in the sense of mystery that the charm of philosophy lies. The progress in our philosophical thinking, as Paulsen rightly said, is nothing more than the statement of the *problem* in a clearer way; by no means could we ever pretend to solve the riddle of existence. Here only Intuition can help us in acquiring a finer appreciation of truth. The poet Schiller, speaking of Kant's philosophy, in his last letter to von Humboldt, said: “The speculative philosophy, if it ever could claim me, has frightened me

away with its empty formulæ; I have found no living fountain and no nourishment on this bleak plain. But the deep and fundamental thoughts of the Ideal philosophy remain an everlasting treasure, and for their sake alone one must deem himself fortunate to have lived at this time" (1805). The intellect runs in a zig-zag course, while intuition is the shortest cut to truth. Einstein had to take great pains to prove scientifically that the straight line was an impossibility. But the east proved it long before, not by means of any inductive methods, but by their direct and intuitive perception ("anubhūti"). So long as intuitive truths remain uncorroborated by 'science,' the sceptical mind of the world hesitates in accepting them. But although science might take you a long way towards your goal, it will never be able to take you to the destination you aim at. It will only deepen your sense of mystery at a stage when you would expect a definite answer from it, and leave you gaping in calf-like wonder!

Let us now turn to another fundamental thought of Hindu philosophy intimately connected with the idea of the impossibility of the straight line. We view life on this earth as only a sequence of a life in the past and an antecedent of a future life. This leads us to the conception of *Karma* and Transmigration.

Our past karma determines for us our station and its duties in the present life, and our *karma* in the present life moulds our future destiny. There are three kinds of *karma*: *sañcita*, *prārabgha*, and *kryamāna*. The first kind includes those acts which in the form of impressions (*samskāras*) we have stored for us during many

previous lives; it is a kind of reserve fund to our credit. The second includes those causes which operate *before* and immediately determine the existence as well as the happiness and misery of a particular individual. The last includes the circumstances which the individual produces under the influence of *prārabdha*. That is to say, the infinite potential, *sañcita*, of an individual, becomes *prārabdha* in its kinetic form, and the working out of these capabilities under proper adaptive circumstances is called *kṛyamāna*.

Karma is a great divine Power. The whole existence from the gods right down to the insignificant ant is subject to Karma. The seed of Karma is called the Samskāra. It may be pure or impure. Pure Karma effects our liberation from bondage, while impure karma leads to our bondage. Karma is without beginning, as is the world. In order that 'karma' may be performed there must exist a 'śarīra' (body), but a 'śarīra' is itself the embodiment of 'karma'; hence we cannot think of a first 'karma': 'karma' must be beginningless. The seed is, for instance, in the sprout, and the sprout in the seed. Thus the inequality noticed in the world can be explained to be due to the inequality in 'karma.' The Creator takes into consideration our balance of 'karma,' merit and demerit, while creating us after each round of birth and death. As the cloud is the common cause of the production of rice, barley and other crops, while the difference between the various kinds is due to the potentialities lying hidden in the various seeds sown, so is the Creator the common cause of the creation of gods, men, etc., while the differences between these

classes of beings are due to the difference in merits belonging to the individual souls. It is impossible, therefore, to reproach the Creator with any cruelty or inequality of dispensation. Without the aid of the conception of 'karma,' it is altogether impossible to explain the *raison d'être* of the inequality of dispensation.

Karma is a great purifier of the mind, and when performed in the right spirit, *i.e.* without any sense of attachment, leads to the state of Jīvanmukti. The 'prārabdha' karma must run its course even at that stage, since by no other means can it be wiped out. A man who has realised 'mukti' before parting with the mortal body may not sow the seeds of any future activity, since his actions are then not prompted by desire or by any sense of attachment, and are consequently like a burnt seed that does not grow in the soil. As soon as his stock of the 'prārabdha karma' is exhausted, he will cast off the mortal body, and then attain to the state of 'Videhamukti,' *i.e.* freedom after the dissociation from the body.

With this is closely connected the idea of Transmigration of the Soul, also known as Metempsychosis. This philosophical idea is a very marked feature of Hindu thought, and of other eastern beliefs as well; traces of it are also found in the writings of some few thinkers of Greece. But it is doubtless foreign to the genius of the western people to believe in the transmigration of the soul. We think that there are open to us possibilities of advancement as well as degeneration; that there are 8,400,000 species of body in the whole creation to which the soul could be united through birth

and death, that man is not necessarily to rise higher but may sink lower into the animal species and return again to the species of man, all this depending upon his merits and demerits, the total balance of his Karma, that the course of evolution does not run in a mere straight line, but that there are many curves and loops before a further progress is made along the straight line, that the principle of Karma binds together into a system all the fourteen worlds we know of. Thus so long as the root cause of all bondage to karma, *viz.* desire, is not eliminated, the soul has to wander about in the various worlds, and in various types of bodies. The soul is, of course, immortal. With the perishing of the body—rather with its transformation into the five *tattvas* (elements), the soul does not perish. After taking on a subtle body, it has again to re-incarnate itself till after many rounds of birth and death, it completes the training for the realisation of Mukti, and then it is freed entirely, without any further possibility of being born again.

Thus you see the close connexion between the ideas of Karma, Transmigration, and Re-incarnation. Here I must not conceal the fact that although a deep-rooted belief in Karma has taught our people to remain satisfied with their lot, it has overdone it so very much as to make most of them lose faith in the immense possibilities open to them for moulding their own destiny in the 'kryamāna' aspect of Karma. They are duped into the belief that Karma means only 'prārabdha', which is to them another name for Destiny. This leads to the

common belief that everything is pre-determined for them, and that it is not open to them to change the course of destiny: most people console themselves by a reference to the well-known couplet from Bhartṛhari:

“Yat dhātrā likhitam lalāta-patale
Tat projjhitaṃ kaś samarthah,”

which means that none is able to wipe out the pre-determined course of events as is sketched by Destiny on our foreheads. This naturally leads to a diseased type of pessimism, and is responsible for a good deal of physical, mental, and moral lethargy.

I need not enter into any further details about the fundamental notions of eastern philosophy. I have already far overstepped the limits of time at my disposal. I have tried to present to you very briefly the more outstanding features which constitute the spirit of our philosophy. My principal aim is to advocate a cultural unity of the East and the West, based on a spirit of mutual understanding and sympathy. Each has something to contribute to the other in the name of an international and universal culture, and each can learn something from the other. I cannot think of a better solution of the acute political and national differences of today than the development of a true spirit of union between the best thoughts of the East and the West. Internationalism in politics, so much the need of today, depends on the realisation of a genuine type of internationalism in culture, which again depends on fostering the spirit of internationalism in philosophy. It is this kind of

understanding which alone will impart a new life and soul to all culture, and will give humanity a sure foothold in the storms of the age: it is the universal life of the spirit within you, which can be enriched by a true synthesis of the culture and philosophy of the East and the West.

LECTURE II
EASTERN SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

LECTURE II

EASTERN SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

THE East is the original home of religion, philosophy, and culture. Great teachers of all universal religions hailed from the East. The earliest philosophical teachers also came from the East. The East had a high type of civilisation when Europe was inhabited with savages. Of all countries in the East, India can claim the most glorious ancient civilisation going back to the age of the Vedas. Long before the earliest Greek philosopher, Thales, rejected the current myths and spoke of water as the source of all things, the Vedic poets had speculated upon the origin of the universe: *e.g.* one Rshi says:

“Then was neither Being nor Non-Being,
No realm of air, no sky beyond;
What enveloped all? Where? In whose care?
Were waters there, the deep abyss?”
(Rgveda, X. 129).

Then, again, see how the goddess of speech (Vāc) explains the underlying unity of all existence. She says:

“Me have the gods in many forms displayed,
Me living everywhere and entering all things.”
(R. V. X. 125.)

Another *Rshi*, named *Dīrghatamas*, praises Fire (*Agni*) many centuries before *Heraclitus* symbolised it as the eternal flux of life:

“Of the one existence, the sages speak in many ways.”
(*R. V. I.* 164.)

Before the rise of Greek civilisation, and before the polytheism of *Homer* and *Hesiod*, the pure idealism of the older *Upanishads* had been propounded. The sage *Yājñavalkya* taught the doctrine of the Self (*ātman*) to his wife, *Maitreyī*, in this strain:

“O *Maitreyī*! see the *ātman*, hear the *ātman*, understand the *ātman*, and mediate upon it; by seeing, hearing, understanding and realising the *ātman*, you will know the whole universe” (*Brh. Up.* ii. 4. 5).

The same sage *Yājñavalkya* further instructed another sage named *Uśasta* in the nature of the *ātman* by saying:

“Thou couldst not see the seer of sight; thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing; thou couldst not think the thinker of thought; thou couldst not know the knower of knowing. This thy *ātman* is within every being, all else is full of sorrow” (*Brh. Up.* iii. 4. 2).

We have the Will-Causality and the whole process of Creation described in the *Taittirīya Upanishad*. There also God is spoken of as the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of all beings—an idea which reappeared in the later trinity of *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu*, and *Śiva*. *Buddha* had preached a lofty moral idealism and the ascetic ideal of

renunciation about one hundred years before Socrates was taught by Prodicus. Systems of Hindu philosophy developed in India before Plato and Aristotle brought about enlightenment in Greece. Even in the domain of sciences like mathematics, astronomy, medicine, etc., the contribution of ancient India has been on a large scale. She also possessed seats of learning and centres of culture in the ancient universities of Taksila (Taxila) and Nālanda, and had organised and developed a system of education that best suited her genius.

It is far from my purpose at present to bring before you a picture of the ancient and glorious civilisation of India, in contrast with her present degeneration. I only wish to impress upon you the truth that you cannot correctly study the history of the world's thought without taking into account India's contribution and rich heritage of the past. Your background of the study of philosophy is the ancient Hellenic civilisation; but you could have a much clearer perspective of the old Greek philosophy by a sympathetic study of the eastern systems of philosophy. This will also help you in sharpening your philosophical insight by presenting to you different avenues of thought, different standpoints and different solutions in different settings. Amidst all these differences is the spirit of *unity*, which you will be delighted to discover by a comparative study of the two types of thought. The problems of philosophy are essentially always the same; and yet they are never the same. The conditions and environments in which they are re-thought are ever changing, thereby giving a new life and vitality to the old problems. I can assure you

that a study of the eastern systems in their general outlines will prove most useful to you as students of international philosophy.

We had an era of an intensely mental and spiritual development represented by the earlier Upanishads, long before the actual *systems* of philosophy were crystallised. The Upanishads are our earliest philosophical treatises. They are the roots from which sprang forth the later systems of philosophy. They are characterised by fluidity and freshness of thought. Their spontaneity of thought presents a contrast with the rigid technique of the later systems. You find in them germs of Idealism, Realism, Pantheism, Theism, Monism, Dualism, Creationism, Acosmism, and what not.

It is, therefore, necessary that you should have a general idea of the teachings of the Upanishads before I deal with the systems proper, all of which, as I told you, took their cue from these texts.

The Upanishads

The Upanishads are our ancient Vedānta, as they are the final thoughts or the quintessence of the Vedas. In this sense, the Vedānta is our most ancient philosophy. There are ten principal Upanishads, although including very minor and late treatises we can count even one hundred and eight of these philosophic texts. We cannot say for certain as to when they were composed. Chronology, although very important in many ways, does not appear of any great use to us in connexion with our study of the Upanishads, since we are more interested in the different views and doctrines that devel-

oped side by side than in tracing the chronology of these texts. Anyhow, without entering into any criticism of what other oriental scholars have to say on this point, I might give you my own view on Vedic chronology. I believe that the Vedas were arranged and put together between 3000 B.C. and 1500 B.C., and the Upanishads between 1000 B.C. and 500 B.C. The earlier Upanishads were certainly pre-buddhistic, and only one or two of the ten Upanishads seems to have been composed a little after Buddha's time. However, that question need not be discussed before you just now. It does not interest us at the present moment.

If you study these philosophic texts very carefully, you will find in them much that can throw light on many controversial points of modern philosophy. For instance, you find that the Upanishads distinctly speak of the *mind* being much wider than *consciousness*. Modern psychology is coming towards the same result, although for more than a century the two terms mind and consciousness have been used synonymously. In sleep, we are told by the Upanishads, there is a break of consciousness, a time-gap in the stream of thought, but the mind still endures. The mind can never sleep. Moreover, there is such a state as the subconscious, which is also included in the totality of the mind, whose one section is called consciousness. Then again, you know there has been of late a good deal of controversy over the fact as to whether the mind is simply the name of mental states or if there is a spiritual self in addition as the subject of all knowledge. The Upanishads discuss this question in the form of a dialogue between

Prajāpati and Indra, and the conclusion is that behind the changing mental states there is an abiding and eternal reality, the light within us, the reality that transcends the body and the mind, which also transcends all relations, and yet makes the subject-object relation possible. The true subject is, therefore, not the mind but the self within and beyond the mind. The continuity of the soul-life knows of no breaks. After enjoying sound sleep for a few hours, you wake up in the morning with a sense of freshness and vigour, and say 'I slept very well indeed.' If there were no witnessing soul present even during sleep, when there is a temporary lapse of your consciousness, there would be no justification for making this statement. Thus there is a 'sākṣī cetana' (a witnessing soul) that lives through eternity.

You have again a reference to the idea of the span of consciousness, and it is rightly said that the mind can attend to only one thing at a time. You have also an enumeration of the sense-organs. There are five organs of knowledge, and five organs of action. The mind is the eleventh organ and 'the sixth sense' of modern spiritualism. Without the activity of the mind, the organs of knowledge can give us no knowledge at all. The soul is about the size of the thumb: it resides in the heart and not in the head. You find here how Aristotle was anticipated in this conception of the Upanishads. Modern psychology has, of course, abandoned this hypothesis in favour of the brain being the seat of the soul, although in a more general sense the whole body is the seat. You have then the idea of the fourth

state of the soul, called *turiyā*, which cannot be grasped by western psychology even today. This is the completely blissful state of the soul, transcending the three states known as *jāgrat* (waking), *svapna* (dreaming), and *susupti* (deep sleep).

Turning to the metaphysics of the Upanishads, you find such simple thoughts as in their loftiness, purity and spontaneity have never been excelled. You find pure idealism, phenomenalism, idealistic pantheism, monism, dualism, ethical spiritualism, agnosticism, mysticism, and others. The *ātman* (self) is proclaimed to be the only reality. Everything is real in so far as it partakes of the same universal existence, the *ātman*. He who imagines the many to have an independent reality goes from death to death; there is no hope for him; his standpoint is false. The truth is that all change is a mere extension of words (*vācārambhanam*), a mere name; the substrate of change, the eternal *ātman*, is the only reality. Plurality has, therefore, only a nominal or empirical existence; from the higher point of view all plurality disappears. The ignorant cannot rise high enough to realise this truth; they live in darkness; they are only wise in their conceit; they pass as very learned people, and go round and round through births and deaths, and are like the blind led by the blind. If you want to discover the *ātman*, turn your gaze inward and meditate silently. Surely your body is not the *ātman*; are vital breaths (*prāṇa*), which are the life-giving principle, the *ātman*? No, go still further. Well, you say, is the mind the *ātman*? No, enter still deeper. Well, is knowledge (*vijñāna*) the self? No, you have

to go still further and discover the final sheath of pure bliss (*ānanda*) as the *ātman*. The self is then pure bliss. The *ātman*, the universal and eternal *sattā*, transcends phenomena. It is changeless and stands out of all relations. Our ordinary experience presupposes relation, since without a correlation of subject and object no knowledge is possible; but such lower knowledge can never lead to the *ātman*. A sage says, where all has become nothing but the *ātman*, there how can one smell anything, how see anything, how hear anything, how speak of anything, how know anything? By what shall one know him by whom everything is known? By what shall one know the knower? This mysticism can hardly be appreciated by those who cannot go beyond the ordinary psychological knowledge based on the subject-object relation. The knowledge of the *ātman* is a spiritual vision. It is an ever-abiding experience and a true demonstration in our life. When the *ātman* is known, everything worth knowing becomes known. The *ātman* is thus the key to all knowledge, key to the whole universe, key to the all. When the *ātman* is known, the sense of multiplicity itself perishes. This very thought is expressed in a simile. It is said that as in the midst of the beating of a drum, it is impossible to hear any other noise from the outside, since they are all merged into the drum-sound, so also when the *ātman* is known there is nothing left further to be known.

This *ātman* is the subject of all knowledge, and is identical with Brahman, the universal Soul. "*Tat tvam asi*" (That art thou) and "*Aham Brahma asmi*" (I am

Brahman) point to the same identity between the individual and the universal soul. The sage Uddālaka expounds the same doctrine to his son by means of very appropriate and simple parables. These simple parables make a direct appeal to the common mind, and you know how they were profitably used later on by Buddha, and then by Jesus. The ātman is the support of all creatures (*sarveśām bhūtānām lokaḥ*). He dwells in all beings, he is the true and subtle essence of everything, yet all beings do not know him. A philosopher who has realised the self or the eternal truth sees himself in the self, and thereby sees everything as his self (*Ātmani eva ātmānam paśyati sarvam ātmānam paśyati*, (*Bṛh. iv. 4. 23*)).

To such a philosopher creation has no meaning. That which is void in the beginning and in the end must also be void in the middle. But the Upanishads have a message not only for the select few who may have attained to such spiritual perfection, but for the less fortunate ones as well. To them creation is a process in time. They ask the question, how was this world produced? How did this creation come about as a fact of our experience? Is there any creator? The Taittirīya Upanishad gives a detailed answer to these queries, although it is touched upon in other texts as well. Brahman, the creator of the world, is the same as that which dwells within us. He is the efficient as well as material cause of the universe, like a spider creating a web from threads from within its body, or like sparks issuing forth from fire (*cf. Bṛh. Up. ii. 1. 20*). In a later Upanishad he is spoken of as covering himself spontaneously like

a spider drawing thread from 'Pradhāna' ('Prakṛti'). This idea was at once picked out later on in the Sāṅkhya system, of which I shall speak presently.

Now, then, how about the process of creation? Brahman, the One, desired to become the many and to be born. The universe is thus a manifestation of the Universal Will. From that ātman was born ether, thence came out air, thence proceeded fire, thence was manifested water and lastly the earth. Brahman is the sole cause of the emanation, support, and destruction of all beings and all worlds.

The question was asked by many then, as would be by even a larger number of common people today, as to how Brahman the Creator of the universe could be identical with the ātman within us. The Upanishads have a message for this section also. A convenient distinction is, therefore, drawn between the individual and the universal spirit. A literal interpretation of this doctrine would naturally lead to Theism; such as we have later in the Yoga system, or, by a slightly different interpretation, to the Dualism of the Sāṅkhya. Brahman, the Creator, is now called the Paramātmān (the great ātman) to distinguish it from the individual self (jīvātman). The Śvetāśvatara Upanishad develops the theistic conception at some length, a further denial of the Paramātmān leaves simply the jīvātman along with the world, which is the basis of the Sāṅkhya. When even the individual soul is denied, and the only reality is the external world as a stream of perceptions, you find therein the basis of the earlier Buddhism. A further degeneration towards the still more concrete explana-

tion would lead to Materialism, which appeared as the Cārvaka school, which is older than any of the orthodox or heretical systems of philosophy. Thus you see that although pure idealism predominates in the teaching of the Upanishads, all the same other tendencies are also to be noticed side by side.

I have no time to enter into any detailed exposition of the philosophy of the Upanishads just now. I may only add that you will find in them a good deal about the life after death, the nature of spiritual freedom, the intrinsic worth of duty for its own sake, the conception of karma, and practically every problem that forms part of our view of life and the world even in the modern times. There is just one point I should like to mention in connexion with the philosophy of the Upanishads. It has been repeatedly misrepresented in the West as a type of Pantheism, that makes God and the world identical. This charge is entirely unfounded and shows nothing but ignorance of the real spirit of the doctrine. This should be plain from the very brief exposition of the teaching of these texts that I have made before you just now. I shall only recite now the well known opening verse of the Upanishads, which many of us in India recite at our morning prayer:

“Pūrnam adaḥ pūrnam idam pūrṇāt pūrnam udacyate,
Pūrnasya pūrnam ādāya pūrnam eva avaśisyate.”

It means “That is Whole, this is whole, from that Whole this whole emanates; taking away this whole from that Whole, the remainder is still a whole.” This is surely far from being the materialistic or crude pantheism that

the Upanishads are said to preach. God is in the Universe, and yet He transcends the Universe. It should be called Pantheism, only if we use the term in its proper sense. The same observations, to a greater or less extent, would, I believe, apply to the philosophy of Spinoza.

With this general introduction as the background of eastern systems, I shall now deal with the systems themselves. First of all we have a reaction against idealism, theism, etc., which manifested itself in various sceptical and positivistic tendencies. Men began to doubt the received opinions and doctrines and proposed to make their own discoveries of truth. All sorts of conflicting views existed side by side, with the result that people, in their helplessness, began to throw overboard all religion and philosophy and discard all scriptural authority and ritualism. Thus at this time, about the sixth century B.C., we have evidence of great fermentation in thought. Several schools of materialism and scepticism arose in consequence. I shall now speak of only the principal school, called the Cārvāka or the Lokāyatika. Soon after appeared two other great systems, which are looked upon by the Hindus as unorthodox, because they do not accept the authority of the Vedas. These systems go by the names of Jainism and Buddhism. Some scholars have fallen into the error of regarding both of them as one and the same, as two names of the same school of thought. That is certainly not true. Jainism is older than Buddhism, and although it has much in common with the latter, it has at the same time much which is distinctive of its own. After these

two systems, we have the orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy. These I shall discuss under three groups, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and the Vedānta (Mīmāṃsā).

The Cārvāka School
(*Materialism*)

While idealism is the predominating thought of India, it is a mistake to suppose that realism, positivism, scepticism, etc., found no place there. Human nature is essentially the same. Everywhere a variety of thought and belief must always exist, the difference is only in the predominating tendencies. India produced, more than 2500 years ago, a school of Materialism, whose doctrines are in many ways the anticipation of the most modern forms of materialism, that was evolved from a dissolution of Hegelianism in the latter half of the last century.

The Cārvākas are the earlier materialists of India. The Hindus look upon them as heretics, for whom there is no possibility of salvation. This school of thought traces its earliest doctrines to the Sūtras of Bṛhaspati, a book that is not available. We find some references to it in later works. The logic of the Cārvākas is very simple; it accepts Perception alone as the channel of our true knowledge. Inference, Testimony, Analogy, Presumption, etc., are all insecure and false. Perception by the senses is the only criterion of truth. We can never perceive the existence of the self, God, heaven, hell, etc., hence all these ideas are absolutely meaningless, and are meant to mislead the ignorant.

Thus the Cārvāka psychology does not allow the existence of the soul as a reality which transcends the body. Matter alone is the ultimate reality: this sums up the metaphysics of this school. Matter exists in the shape of the four elements of earth, water, fire and air. Everything that exists is in some shape or other a modification of these very elements. And the soul is nothing more than a product of the combination of these four elements. As you mix certain ingredients in order to produce the quality known as intoxication, so the mixing together of the four elements produces a new form or quality called the soul. The soul does not survive the destruction of the body, but perishes with it. Thus the Cārvākas have no eschatology, no future life, no immortality, no God. In their ethics they are extreme hedonists, and anticipate the doctrines of the Cyrenaics. To them pleasure, and of course pleasure of the senses, is the highest good. There is no such thing as sin or vice. What is pleasant is good, and what hinders or thwarts our pleasure is bad. Beyond that, there is no intrinsic good or evil.

There is no author of creation. Everything exists and undergoes change according to its nature (*svabhāva*), its inherent necessity. That is why fire is hot and water is cold. It is only their nature that makes them so. It is useless to waste any time in inquiring further into the cause of these phenomena. It is *svabhāva* alone that explains causation.

Our aim in life must, therefore, be to secure the greatest amount of pleasure for ourselves. We must look after the body as best we can, since that is the vehicle

of all our pleasures. It is necessary, therefore, that we should nourish and tone up the body "by drinking ghee, even at the expense of borrowing money for this purpose, because once the body is reduced to ashes, it will never return." This general hedonistic conception is expressed in the sloka:

"Yāvat jīvet, sukham jīvet, *rnam kṛtvā ghṛtam pivet;*
Bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punar āgamanam kutah."

Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow you may have to die: this is the guiding principle of this school. Matter alone is real; and man is what he eats—a complete anticipation of Feuerbach's pun "*Man ist was er isst.*"

Along with the Cārvākas there were several other minor sceptical and positivistic schools, such as those of Ajita Keśakambali and others, but I am afraid it is out of the question to refer to them just now. I shall now endeavour to give you a general idea of the two great heretical systems, Jainism and Buddhism.

Jainism

Jainism is traditionally a very ancient system, containing the earliest animistic beliefs current in India. It was founded at first by Rṣabhadeva, who must have lived some six or seven centuries before Buddha. He was the first prophet of the Jainas; but usually a far less remote prophet, the last or the twenty-fourth prophet in the line of succession starting from Rṣabhadeva, is recognised as the founder of this system. His name was Vardhamāna, better known as Mahāvīra, to whom the title of 'Jaina,' *i.e.* the Conqueror, was also

applied along with a number of other titles. Mahāvīra was born in about 599 B.C. and died in 527 B.C. He was a ksatriya by caste. At the age of thirty he is said to have joined the monastic order of Pāraśvanātha, the twenty-third prophet (*tīrthankara*) of the Jainas, but left it after a year, and then spent 11 years in severe austerities (*tapas*), and attained perfection (*kevalship*); and afterwards began to preach his message to people, who followed him in large numbers. During the period of his austerities, he mostly went about naked, since he believed that renunciation requires a complete abandonment of all our belongings, including the clothes, and that the four quarters and the sky are enough as our natural garment. On this point he differed with his predecessor, Pāraśvanātha (about 800 B.C.), who allowed the wearing of clothes. On this basis, the order of the Jainas divided into two sects later on, about 80 A.D., one was called the Śvetāmbara (white-clothed), and the other was known as the Digambara (nude). The latter are the representatives of a more extreme type. They represent a *tīrthankara* (saint, or perfect soul) nude and with downcast eyes; and believe that those who wear clothes cannot attain blessedness. The literature of the Jainas is mostly connected with the Śvetāmbara sect.

Now, as to the philosophy of this system, it must be admitted that they have a very elaborate logic and dialectic. As I shall point out presently, they anticipated Pragmatism in their doctrine of Naya (aspects) and the relativity of all knowledge, more than a century before Protagoras spoke of man as the measure of all things.

They are known as Anekāntavādins or Relativists. Workability is the criterion of truth. True knowledge always works for some purpose, and is free from contradiction. All things in the universe are mutually related, hence our knowledge of the world must be relative. Existence and non-existence could both be attributed to a thing from different standpoints. The same man is spoken of as father, son, brother, father-in-law, etc. Each of these concepts is true in a sense, and not true in another sense.

Knowledge exists in five grades: *Mati* (Sensuous knowledge), *Śruta* (Testimony), *Avadhi* (Clairvoyance), *Manahparyāya* (Mental Telepathy), and *Kevala* (Absolute knowledge). Tradition says that Mahāvīra was born with the first three kinds of knowledge, and gained the other two by his austerities. The first three kinds are partially direct, and contain the possibility of error as well. Of these three, the first two are indirect or mediate knowledge, which again has five forms: *Smṛti* (Memory), *Pratyabhijñāna* (Recognition), *Tarka* (Generalisation), *Anumāna* (Inference), and *Śabda* (Word). Tirthankaras alone have attained the last kind of knowledge, the *Kevala-jñāna*, an intuitive perception, and every soul by following the proper way could attain to that state of blessedness; it is not impossible. To the majority, such knowledge seems impossible; as they are content with their imperfect and relative knowledge.

The central idea of the Jain logic is its doctrine of *Syādvāda*, which is based on *Saptabhaṅgī* (the doctrine of seven aspects). We can have complete knowledge

of an object by viewing it in all its partial aspects. Each standpoint is expressed in a single judgment, which because of its partial nature cannot by itself give us any more than probable knowledge. No affirmation or denial is possible in an absolute sense. The following are the seven ways of predication, taking the stock example of a jar, each judgment is a relative or conditional truth:

1. Possibly the jar is.
2. Possibly the jar is not.
3. Possibly the jar is and is not (in different senses).
4. Possibly the jar is unpredicable.
5. Possibly the jar is, and is unpredicable.
6. Possibly the jar is not, and is unpredicable.
7. Possibly the jar is, is not, and is unpredicable.

This doctrine of Syādvāda is just one part of the Jain doctrine of Saptabhāṅgi, the other part is called the Nayavāda. *Naya* means a standpoint, and Nayavāda is the doctrine of standpoints, the analytical procedure through which we arrive at a complete knowledge. Syādvāda emphasises the objective procedure in knowledge, while Nayavāda emphasises the subjective side. As *Naya* is an individual's standpoint, obviously the number of *nayas* could be countless. But seven principal *nayas* are recognised in the Jain logic:—1. *Nai-gama*; 2. *Samgraha*; 3. *Vyavahāra*; 4. *Rjusūtra*; 5. *Śabda*; 6. *Samabhiruddha*; and 7. *Evambhūta*. The violation of these *nayas* gives rise to fallacies, which we must guard against for the attainment of correct and complete knowledge.

Syādvāda arises from a complete rejection of the idea of the Absolute. We can never define the absolute nature of anything. For instance, our experience tells us that there is a book lying on the table. Now, the question may be asked as to what constitutes the real nature of the book or the table, which I see before me. Can we attribute 'being' or 'non-being' to it? It cannot be 'being' and we cannot say 'the table is' or 'the book is,' since the word 'table' (or 'book') implies 'is' or 'being'; the very concept of a thing involves its existence for the mind, and makes it an object in the psychological sense. Hence, if we said 'the table is,' we should be making a tautological judgment. On the other hand, we cannot determine the nature of a thing by attributing to it 'non-being.' Thus we cannot say 'it is not a table,' or 'a book is not,' as this judgment would involve a direct contradiction, existence and non-existence being mutually exclusive.

In modern times, we meet with an analogous idea in Hegel's logic. Hegel pointed out that the process of knowing could neither be described as analysis nor as synthesis, but as a *system* or the manifestation of a unity in difference. Hegel emphatically denied that we seek real identity or that we assert mere difference. What we do is to begin with system and then articulate it. While Jain logic does not speak of any 'system' in the Hegelian sense, it agrees with him in rejecting the ideas of mere identity or mere difference. If we keep our thought confined within the self-identity of an object, we are thereby arresting its very existence. For instance the judgment 'A is A' is a mere tautology, and is con-

sequently meaningless. In order to be significant, our thought must pass beyond the bare identity of an object with itself. At the same time, it must not pass to something which has nothing in common with the object. Thus if we assert 'A is B,' the judgment is false, since we pass from A to B, which has nothing in common with A. With a slight modification, the Jain logic can well endorse the modern statement of Hegel that "a thing must other itself in order to be itself."

The Jainas no doubt believe that the doctrine of Saptabhaṅgī is quite original in their system. We can not possibly think of any earlier statement or reference to the doctrine. But it is difficult to endorse the claim of the Jainas that this doctrine solves all problems of knowledge. It only sums up very exhaustively one principal aspect of viewing Reality. A brilliant criticism of the doctrine is to be met with in later systems, and our students are quite familiar with the way Śāṅkara subjects it to his subtle polemic in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras.

The Jain logic recognises only two modes of proof, *viz.* Perception and Inference. Each act of perception implies the destruction of a veil of ignorance, whereby the self becomes aware of the existence of objects, which exist independently of the mind and are not mere ideas. It is the self that perceives objects through the senses. This naturally leads us into their Psychology. Unlike the Buddhists, the Jainas believe in the existence of a self, and the reality of the external world. As to their idea of the soul, they say that it is as big as the body. In the elephant it is very big, while in the ant

it is very small. The soul pervades the whole body, as a lamp placed at any one spot in a room lights up the whole room. The Jain psychology is closely connected with their metaphysics. The whole existence is viewed under two categories or predicaments (*tattvas*), viz. *Jīva* (soul, or life) and *Ajīva* (non-soul). A right knowledge of these *tattvas* is essential to final liberation. A liberated soul cuts through the thin veil of *karma*, which covers the non-liberated souls. The ordinary *jīva* is made to be born and reborn by the force of his *karma*. The Jainas usually divide *jīvas* according to the number of senses they possess. There are those that possess only one sense, *e.g.* stones, clay, snow, rain, fire, light, wind, cyclone, trees, plants, vegetables, etc. Ordinary people cannot perceive these souls, only the liberated souls can. There are those possessed of two senses, such as worms. Then we have those possessing three senses, for instance, ants, bugs, moths, etc.; and those having four senses, as wasps, flies, mosquitoes; and those having five senses, *viz.* lower animals, human beings, and those who reside in the lower regions and those in upper regions (gods). There are several other principles of classification as well, but it is no use referring to those details just at present.

The second great *tattva* is *Ajīva*, the non-living. It has two classes, the formless and the formed. The former is further divided into four classes, (1) *Dharmāstikāya*, (2) *Adharmāstikāya*, (3) *Ākāśāstikāya*, (4) *Kāla*. *Astikāya* means a body occupying space, a spatial existence. *Kāla* is conceived as eternal and indivisible existence; it is an all-pervading category, and is

not to be confused with Time in its ordinarily accepted sense. As to the latter class, *i.e.* Ajīva possessing form (rūpi), it has only one class, called Pudgalāstikāya, *i.e.* matter which can be perceived by the senses. Pudgala has colour, smell, taste, touch, and form. There are some 560 divisions of this Pudgala. It is this Pudgala that creates karma. So long as the jīva is bound by karma created by pudgala, there is for him samsāra, and he is born and reborn; when the jīva is without any contact with pudgala, he is free.

Instead of two tattvas, Jīva and Ajīva, sometimes they adopt a different classification, and enumerate as many as seven tattvas, which are Jīva, Ajīva, Āśrava, Samvara, Bandha, Nirjarā, and Mokṣa. To these are sometimes added two more namely Puṇya and Pāpa, making altogether nine. I have already described Jīva and Ajīva. Āśrava means the incoming or flowing in of karma, or the action of the senses which moves the soul towards external objects, and is the cause of mundane existence. The Jainas mention forty-two principal entrances through which karma may pour in. Samvara is the stopping of karma from entering into the soul and is thus the cause of liberation. There are fifty-seven ways in which this can be done. Bandha means bondage, that which binds jīva and ajīva together, and that is nothing else but karma. There are four kinds of bondage to karma. Nirjarā is that which destroys karma, and this can be done by twelve kinds of austerities, six of them are external and six internal. Mokṣa is the liberation of the jīva from its bondage with ajīva.

Now, as to the ethics of the Jainas, I might sum up very briefly by saying that they believe in nine kinds of *punya* (merit), and eighteen kinds of *pāpa* (demerit). They hold that liberation of the *jīva* from the *ajīva* is the *summum bonum* of life, and this can only be realised by right insight, right knowledge, and right conduct. A belief in and knowledge of the various *tattvas* leads to right insight and right knowledge, and right conduct is the performance of good actions and abstaining from bad actions, accompanied with a recoil from the worldly objects and interests. These three "gems" are interdependent and must be taken together. A virtuous man is one who acts according to the following principles: (1) he must not kill any *jīva* but should show all kindness and regard for life, (2) he must always practise truthfulness and never tell a lie, (3) he must never steal, (4) he must always be chaste, and (5) he must renounce all worldly interests. You will see that the taking of life, that is killing a *jīva*, is the greatest sin according to the Jainas, and I know my Jain friends in Calcutta never take their meals after sunset, and never take meat. There are very strict injunctions for ascetics, which are somewhat relaxed for laymen. When the Jain ascetics walk, they sweep the ground before them by a broom made of peacock feathers, they cover their mouth with a strip of cloth, they drink water only after it is boiled, they never travel by rail but always on foot, they do not undertake a journey during rainy days, when numberless small creatures are born spontaneously of the earth, and so on.

A life of asceticism is enjoined for all Jainas, even for

laymen, since without that liberation is impossible. Women are also admitted to their community, though they believe that women must be born as men in another life in order to have final liberation. A man who practices deceitfulness in this life may be born a woman in the next life as a kind of punishment. A jain sādhu (ascetic or monk) must not touch even the hem of a woman for fear of being defiled. The Jainas must do their best to tear off four *kaṣāyas*, *viz.* *krodha* (anger), *māna* (conceit), *māyā* (deceitfulness), and *lobha* (avarice). These are our worst enemies and obstruct the path to liberation.

This, in brief, is the Jaina philosophy. It does not allow the existence of a God, but *jīvas* after being liberated might become *tīrthaṅkaras*, exalted souls, who can perform all the functions of gods. Most of the Jainas reside in Bombay and Ahmedabad; there is quite a number of them in Calcutta; but north India has very few. As a class they are rich traders, and lead a simple and peaceful life. I have never come across any Jain who was not a vegetarian.

Let me now hasten to the other systems of philosophy. After Jainism, let me tell you something of Buddhism, which is another unorthodox system, and which has produced a profound influence on the religious and ethical ideas of the world.

Buddhism

Buddhism was founded by Buddha, the enlightened, whose proper name was Gautama. He was a junior contemporary of Mahāvīra, and was born in 560 B.C. and attained his *nirvāṇa* at the age of eighty. After

attaining his enlightenment he preached his message for some forty-five years. It is said that in his early years he went out for a drive with his charioteer, when he noticed first a very old man in distress, then a diseased man, then a dead body being taken to the cremation ground, and then an ascetic. He became convinced that the world was nothing but suffering, and left his father's palace and went in quest of the means whereby he could conquer suffering. He tried 'tapas' as a means to that end, but found that it was not the proper way. After resuming ordinary life, truth revealed itself to him at last, and from that moment he went about spreading his gospel far and wide. The popularity and success were to a great extent due not only to his lofty ethical teaching and a universalism free from the shackles of caste and ritualism, but also to his magnetic personality. He won a very large number of disciples all over India. After his death, two principal schools developed within the original doctrine and separated from each other, more or less in the same way as the disciples of Socrates developed Cynicism and Cyrenaism by emphasising some one special feature of their master's personality or thought. Councils met in order to modify the rigorous asceticism of Buddha's doctrine in some respects. There appeared an orthodox party, which opposed all such attempts, and a liberal party which initiated them. There were as many as eighteen minor parties, each claiming to be the true representative of the spirit of Buddha's teaching. But two principal schools became definitely settled and separated from each other. One was called the Hīnayāna, representing the orthodox section, spreading mostly in Cey-

lon and Burma; and the other was known as the Mahāyāna, representing the liberal and accommodating section, which spread later on in Nepal, China, and Japan. The Mahāyāna school accepted the canon drawn up in the time of Kaniska in the Punjab, and brought about a reconciliation with some of the principal doctrines of Brāhmanism, allowing the ideas of God, soul, māyā, etc. It is the Hīnayāna that is also called the Pāli Buddhism, since its canons are in Pāli, and not in Sanskrit. The severity and rigour of the Hīnayāna was very much lessened in the Mahāyāna with its broader and more positive conception of Nirvāna, the ideal of Bodhisattva, and a more universalistic ethics and religion. Later on there appeared the four principal schools of Buddhism. Two of these, *viz.* the Sautrāntikas (Representationists) and the Vaibhāsikas (Presentationists) are the Hīnayāna schools, and represent Realism. The other two, the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas, belong to the Mahāyāna school, and represent respectively Idealism and Nihilism. Thus we have three different systems constituted by these four schools:

REALISTS, represented by the Sarvāstivādins, who are either Sautrāntikas or Vaibhāsikas.

IDEALISTS, represented by the Yogācāras, also known as the Vijñānavādins.

NIHILISTS, represented by the Mādhyamikas, also called the Śūnyavādins.

The Realists maintained that everything exists, that the universe existing in space and time is a reality, which

is self-existent, that right knowledge is not a momentary flash but a gradual development, that consciousness is an eternal flux, and that an *arbat* in possession of nirvāṇa could fall away. They also distinguish a pudgala (soul) from the skandhas (elements of things), which are five in number. The sense organs are simply modifications of matter. Matter and the five skandhas are eternal. Thus the doctrine of Sarvāstivāda is simply pluralistic realism. They take the external world as a reality, in which objects are neither external like the elements nor internal like the intelligence (*citta*). The Sautrāntika-Realists share much in common with the modern theory of Representative Perception and hold 'All is *like* itself.' The elements are four in number, *viz.* earth, water, fire, and air. External objects are, therefore, the aggregate of atoms. An atom is the smallest particle of *rūpa*, and is indivisible, unanalysable, and imperceptible by the senses. We cannot perceive a single atom, but can perceive their aggregation, just as we cannot see a single hair, but can see a cluster of hair. The atom, though one, has six sides. The smallest atomic unit that can be perceived is an *anu*, which is a combination of *paramāṇus*. Our material senses grasp the external objects and arouse consciousness, beyond which there is no such thing as soul.

According to the Vaibhāsikas, we perceive the world directly and not through any ideas or representations, while the Sautrāntikas maintain that we know things through ideas or representations. This reminds us of Berkeley's polemic against Locke's theory of representative perception. The Sautrāntikas also hold that the

objects we perceive are all momentary, and the idea of permanence is only an illusion. This again reminds us of Hume's criticism of the notion of necessary connexion and the self. They also believe that there is not only consciousness but also self-consciousness, that thoughts are themselves thinkers, which is to anticipate modern psychologists like William James. The Vaibhāsikas are Presentationists, and maintain that external objects can be perceived either as sensible or as cogitable. They also hold that all is void.

The Idealists believe (like Berkeley) that the external world is an ideal construction, that consciousness (*vijñāna*) alone is a reality, that things apart from thoughts are nothing. There is no such thing as material substance. Matter as the unknown support of qualities is a myth. All qualities are mind-dependent, and objects have no existence independent of the mind. Objects *quâ* objects have no existence; they are only thought relations. They are phenomena or manifestations of the *ālaya* within us. All this is an excellent anticipation of Berkeley's subjective idealism, with which you are quite familiar. The Vijñānavādins are also known as Yogācāras, because they emphasise the importance of practising yoga for the attainment of the state of Bodhisattva. They hold that all is pain.

The Nihilists are the Mādhyamikas, or the Śūnyavādins. They have a mixture of scepticism, mysticism, and nihilism. Nāgārjuna is the great representative of this theory. Nothing is real. A thing is simply an appearance of a mass of dharmas, following one another in continuity. Phenomena have no essence. Dharmas

alone exist. Phenomena are illusory or produced by *māyā*. As they have no essence, they depend on one another. Nāgārjuna has propounded a brilliant theory of relations. The world is a vast network of relations, and possesses no substantial existence. There is no permanent self, as there is no permanent world. All is momentary; all is void. *Nirvāṇa* is the complete cessation of the phenomenal flux. There is no *bandha*, no *mokṣa*, no positive existence, no Buddha, no reality, no existence; in fact all is void or *śūnya*. Neither existence nor non-existence can be affirmed of anything. All is *śūnya*. As one would extinguish fire if it caught one's garment, so should one extinguish all desire, because without such annihilation *nirvāṇa* is unattainable.

After this brief sketch of the various schools of Buddhism, I shall now revert to the earlier Buddhism, and present to you the more important ideas of its psychology, metaphysics, and ethics. Buddha started from the grim reality of pain and suffering. How to find a way of escape from suffering? Buddha analysed this problem thoroughly. Suffering, he thought, was caused by decay and death, which were dependent on birth. But birth indicated a previous existence, which was due to *upādāna* (clinging), which again was due to desire, which again arose from *vedanā* (feeling). This *vedanā* resulted from a contact of the senses, whose *āyatana*s depended on *nāmarūpa* (mind and body). *Nāmarūpa* was traced back to *viññāna* (consciousness), which again was due to *sankhāra*, which was in turn caused by *avidyā* (ignorance). Thus he traced all suffering to its

root in āvidyā. This is known as the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda (Dependent Origination).

Reality is ceaseless change. There is nothing permanent. There is no unchanging and immutable reality behind change, but change itself is the ultimate fact of experience. All is becoming; there is no being. We are reminded of Heraclitus as well as Bergson. Buddha denied the existence of a permanent soul. In fact he did not definitely and emphatically commit himself on this point, but usually kept silence, when the question was raised. There is no self, but only the five skandhas put together, which lead us to imagine the existence of a separate self. These skandhas are aggregates of physical and psychical states, and are five in number, viz. rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, saṅkhāra and vijñāna. The ego is simply a delusion, and turns out to be nothing more than a reference to one or all the five skandhas.

“As the various parts of a chariot, when united, form the chariot, so the five skandhas, when united in one body, form a being, a living existence.” Thus the soul is not hypostatised, but is viewed as the unity of the five skandhas. This is in no way an unnatural view. In modern times, for instance, when psychology is being studied more as science than as philosophy, the majority of psychologists discard altogether the idea of the soul as a transcendental substance behind and above all our mental phenomena, and view it as the ‘I,’ the ego or the mind as such, which they hold is a mere name for a unique unity of our mental states. This conception is quite analogous in this aspect to the one we meet with in Buddhistic psychology. We read of the Greek king,

Menander, enquiring of Nāgasena as to his name, to which Nāgasena replied: "I am called Nāgasena by my parents, the priests, and others. But Nāgasena is not a separate entity."

Desire is our great enemy, because it is responsible for our continuous births and rebirths. It is called *trsnā*, and corresponds to Schopenhauer's Will to Live. If we can conquer this *trsnā*, karma will have no further fruit, and our actions will be like putting a burnt seed in the soil, which never grows. We must, therefore, renounce this craving or desire, and if we do that we become saints. A saint must pass through the effects of karma of the previous lives, but as he has conquered *trsnā*, he will not have any new effects. With the annihilation of desire comes the destruction of sorrow, which is called *nirvāna*. This emancipation from sorrow is not a mere negative condition, but a life of positive and unmixed bliss. The idea of *nirvāna* is the subject of much controversy, in which it is useless to enter just now. Buddha points a way to *nirvāna* in what is called the eightfold path. It consists of right beliefs, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right living, right effort, right mindedness, and right rapture. This path constitutes the practical ethics of Buddhism.

This eightfold path has four stages. At the first stage, there is a keen desire to enter the path, and it brings about a mental conversion of the man. He keeps company with the good, hears of the law and has his doubts removed, practises enlightened reflexion as well as virtue. At the second stage, he endeavours to overcome the promptings of the lower self, and by further

enlightened discrimination overcomes lust, hatred, etc. If he stops at this path, and rises up no further, he is to return to this world once more. At the third stage, discrimination is further developed, and the will is so rightly trained as to enable one to conquer all sensuality and hatred. From this stage there is no coming back to this world. The last and the fourth stage of the Path is reached only by the Arhats or the Buddhistic saints, who have been able to annihilate desire out and out.

While passing through these four stages, we have to encounter and overcome ten sins, viz. delusion of body, doubt, faith in rituals, sensuality, hatred (when these five sins are conquered, one becomes an Arhat and enters the fourth path), love of earthly form (life), love of life hereafter, pride, self-righteousness, and ignorance (after conquering these sins, one conquers all sorrow and attains to *Nirvāṇa*).

Nirvāṇa is the fruit of the last path. It is usually taken to mean complete annihilation or extinction of life. But it is not a mere negative conception. It implies, of course, the extinction of desire, the cessation of the unholy impulse to renewed individual existence. But it has a positive meaning as well, and signifies the state of absolute bliss, absolute holiness, where even the slightest trace of sin or sinful impulse does not exist. In fact, the very existence of impulse as such being sinful, it is a state of complete freedom from all impulsive activity, a state of perfect peace and tranquillity. Hence, *nirvāṇa* does not mean death but an eternal blissful life.

The ethics of Buddhism does not propound mere

abstract universal principles like 'Be good' or 'Be truthful' or 'Treat humanity as an end-in-itself,' but works out in detail a complete moral code. Abstract universals like Kant's Categorical Imperative have their own value, but to the majority of people with a limited understanding, they fail to serve as a proper guide to conduct unless they are supplemented with more concrete precepts.' Buddhism supplies that want, and in addition to laying down universal principles like Kant's Categorical Imperative, it analyses the whole moral life, diagnoses the ultimate cause of sorrow and suffering as *trsnā* (lit. thirst), our lust of life, 'the will to live'—to use a more modern expression—lays down the duties of people at different stages of life, and expounds the great Law by setting down the four Great Meditations, the four Great Efforts, the four Roads to Holiness, the five Moral Forces, the seven types of Wisdom, and the eightfold Path. Thus are explained not only the Moral Ideals, but also the means for their attainment.

For the mendicants of the Buddhistic Order the code of morals is more stern and rigid than that of laymen or householders. For instance, a householder is enjoined (1) not to destroy life, (2) not to steal, (3) not to tell lies, (4) not to drink intoxicants, and (5) not to commit adultery. A mendicant is required, in addition, to observe celibacy, avoiding married life as if it were 'a burning pit of live coals,' refrain from eating undesirable food, not to wear garlands, not to use perfumes, not to dance, sing or act in a theatre, not to use gold and silver and to sleep on a mat spread out on the ground. Obviously it is meant that the mendicant

should develop within him the spirit of renunciation, and consequently avoid everything calculated to serve as a temptation or to throw him off his track.

Before leaving this system, let me give you an idea of the way 'right conduct' or 'good behaviour' is analysed in Buddhistic ethics. Actions are either good or bad. Good actions are those that are specifically defined as 'Duties' along with those that avoid evil deeds or sins. Sins may be classed under three categories: sins of body, speech, and mind. Bodily sins are such as murder, theft, and adultery; the sins of speech are telling a lie, calumny, abuse and idle or vain talk; and mental sins are avarice, hatred, and error. Buddhism has a message for the whole of humanity. It transcends all distinctions of caste, class, race or colour, and preaches a message of peace, purity and good-will to the whole world. It is not necessarily a negation of Brāhmanism, but is a very noble and wonderful attempt to supplement Hindu ethics with a complete survey of the moral life with all its requirements and implications.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika may be treated as one system, as the differences of their standpoints are only minor. The Vaiśeṣika is supposed to be more ancient than the Nyāya, though the tradition on which the joint system is based can be traced back several centuries before the doctrines were 'systematised.'

It is usual to speak of this system as Logic, but as a matter of fact we have no logic pure and simple in the ancient systems; it is mixed with dialectic, psychology,

epistemology, ethics, etc. It is only in the modern Navya Nyāya (1200 A.D.) that the theory of proof is particularly emphasised. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system also believes in the world being full of suffering, owing to our false knowledge, by which we treat the self as not-self. It is false knowledge which is responsible for our bondage. This bondage is removed by true knowledge of the sixteen Padārthas according to the Nyāya, and the six Padārthas or Categories according to the Vaiśeṣika. With the destruction of our false knowledge the 'doṣas' are removed, and with them ceases all 'pravṛtti,' then all birth, and consequently all suffering. Thus we attain to salvation, which is freedom from all pain and suffering.

The sixteen padārthas of the Nyāya are: Pramāṇa (means of right knowledge), Prameya (objects of right knowledge), Saṁśaya (doubt), Prayojana (purpose), Dṛṣṭānta (illustration), Siddhānta (established truth), Avayava (premises), Tarka (argument), Nirṇaya (conclusion), Vāda (controversy), Jalpa (sophistry), Vitandā (wrangling), Hetvābhāsa (fallacies), Chala (quibble), Jāti (futile reasoning), and Nigrahasthāna (points of adversary's defeat). Out of these sixteen subjects of study, the most important are the first two, Pramāṇa and Prameya, and of these two, the latter, *viz.* Prameya, is the more important. The six categories of the Vaiśeṣika are not in any way identical with this list of sixteen topics. Those six categories may be taken to be the six classes of Prameya, and these categories are: Dravya (substance), Guṇa (attribute or quality), Karma (action), Sāmānya (genus), Viśeṣa (individual-

ity), and Samavāya (coinherence). These are very similar to Aristotle's Categories. Later on, a seventh category, *viz.* Abhāva (negation) was added.

The logic of this system is the treatment of the doctrine of Pramāṇa, or means of right knowledge. I told you that the Cārvāka system recognised only one pramāṇa, that is Perception. The Buddhists recognised two pramāṇas, Perception and Inference. Kanāda, the author of the Vaiśeṣika, also accepted these two pramāṇas only, while Gotama, the author of the Nyāya, admitted four, *viz.* Perception, Inference, Analogy, and Testimony. Perception is the knowledge derived from a contact of the senses with the external objects. There are five senses, composed of one or more of the five elements. Thus the senses are material, and their actual contact with the objects is due to a kind of vibratory movement and nothing else. The second means of right knowledge is Inference, which is of three kinds, pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. The doctrine of Inference is treated in full details in the Nyāya, and it has been exclusively developed and elaborated in the modern school of Navya-Nyāya, with its centre at Navadvipa in Bengal. The doctrine of Vyāpti (concomitance) is the most important part of the theory of inference and is fully discussed in the system. The third means is Analogy, which is based on the recognition of likeness to a characteristic well known before. The fourth is Testimony or word that can be trusted (āpta-vacana), and this might come from the *ṛsis*, the ārya and the foreigners, if they are well informed.

Prameya is right knowledge, established by the pra-

mānas. It includes the self, the body, the senses, their objects, understanding, mind, conation or activity, faults, transmigration, rewards of deeds, suffering, and emancipation.

The topics which constitute Prameya are differently enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika as six categories, as I told you a little while ago. The first category is Substance. The Vaiśeṣika mentions nine substances, namely, earth, water, fire, air, ether (ākāśa), time, space, ātman (self), and mind (manas). Substance cannot exist without qualities, which is the second category, and there are mentioned no less than seventeen qualities. The third ontological category is Karma, or action, which is change or movement. There are five kinds of such action; upward, downward, contraction, expansion, and action in general. The next category is Sāmānya, or the genus, which binds together individual things into concepts. It is also known as jāti. The fifth category is Viśeṣa, which enables us to perceive individual things as such. It is the specific difference which distinguishes individual things. The last category is Sāmānya, or the inseparable coinherence between substance and attribute, cause and effect, etc. This is, therefore, an inseparable relation. These six categories are ontological realities, and exist quite independent of the mind. In fact, they sum up the whole of existence, whose right knowledge will save us from suffering, and thus lead us to emancipation or the complete cessation of pain.

This system believes in the existence of the self (ātman) as well as of Īśvara (God). The self is the substance in which the knowledge derived from the

contact of the senses with their objects inheres. It is the subject of desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, effort, and knowledge. The existence of the self does not follow from the mere notion of our self-consciousness, but is demonstrated by inference. The *ātman* is eternal and all-pervading.

The existence of God, or *Īśvara*, is also proved by inference, by the employment of the Causal argument, as well as the Teleological argument. The world as a whole is an effect, and must have a cause, and that cause is no other than *Īśvara*. Again, the world as a whole gives evidence of adaptation, order and arrangement; hence there must be an orderer, who is no other than *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* creates the world from eternal atoms by his own Will Power.

The Atomic theory, though known to the *Nyāya*, is the peculiar feature of the *Vaiśeṣika*, since it is in the latter that it is systematically formulated. *Kaṇāda* held that if we go on dividing matter, we shall have to suppose a limit beyond which we cannot think of further divisibility. The smallest possible particles are called atoms (*anus*). There are four kinds of atoms, those of earth, water, fire, and air, and they possess a continuous vibratory motion. Only with the four elements is an atomic aggregation possible. By themselves, the atoms are eternal, but in their combined states they are non-eternal. Two atoms combine to form a molecule (*dvyanuka*). Neither the atoms nor the molecules are visible. Their visibility begins with the *Tryanuka*, which is the combination of three molecules or double-atoms. What makes these atoms unite? This is

answered in two ways. One view is that it is due to an inherent necessity, as was also held by Democritus; the other view brings in the idea of the 'adr̥ṣṭa,' that is the will of God, which is responsible for their combination and arrangement. Sometimes the atom is described as the sixth part of a mote in a sunbeam. You will note one principal point of difference as compared with the atomic theory of the old Greeks, like Democritus, and of the later Epicureans. The Greeks spoke of atoms as the least conceivable primitive, immutable, and indivisible particles, *alike in quality*, though unlike in quantity. The Vaiśeṣika viewed them unlike not only as to quantity but also as to quality, and thus spoke of four qualitatively different kinds of atoms. The doctrine of Pīlupāka says that first the molecules are decomposed into atoms by the force of heat, then a change in their quality takes place, and afterwards a recombination of the atoms. This is Kanāda's view and is slightly different from the Nyāya view according to which there is no decomposition of the molecules, but their qualities are directly affected and new combinations formed under the influence of heat: a change of colour also takes place accordingly. Along with the Atomic theory we have in this system a well-developed theory of heat, light, and sound, which seems to have been the earliest systematic anticipation of some of the modern ideas of Physics, and make a very interesting study, which, however, is alien to our present interest.

Let me now deal with the theory of Causation, which holds a very important place in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. This is in direct opposition to the satkāryavāda

of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta, according to which the cause and the effect are essentially identical, the effect existing potentially in the cause, existence originating from existence alone. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that the effect is non-existent in the cause prior to its creation. This is known as the doctrine of *asatkārya-vāda*. The effect as produced is non-existent in the cause. For instance, a potter moulds a jar out of clay by means of his wheel and stick. By the putting together of inherent powers of clay, wheel and stick, the cause is destroyed and a new effect, non-existent in the cause previously, is spread out (*ārambhavāda*).

The identity of cause and effect is denied. Causation is a relation of sequence in time. A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect. This empirical view of causation is very similar to Mill's in this respect. Causation is operative within a common aggregate of conditions, such as time, space, the *adṛṣṭa*, etc. Although the effect does not exist in the cause before the operation of the cause, the qualities of the effect are certainly transmitted into the effect from their pre-existence in the cause.

This system considers three different aspects of cause. A cause may be *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi*, and *nimitta*. All the three are required to produce an effect jointly. Thus the *samavāyi* cause of a jar is the clay, usually called the material cause. There is a mutually inherent relation called the *samavāya* between the clay and the jar. If the clay is black, the jar will also be black. Thus the colour of the clay is the *asamavāyi* cause of the colour of the jug. This cause operates through the *samavāyi*

cause in the production of the effect. All the qualities of a samavāyi cause may, therefore, be looked upon as the asamavāyi cause of the effect. The third kind is the nimitta cause, which includes the potter who moulds the clay into the jar, the wheel and the stick used by him. This is usually known as the instrumental cause.

Here I may stop the brief review of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. I have pointed out to you that this is an āstika or theistic system, believing in the reality of God, man and the world. It offers a mechanical and teleological explanation of nature, believes in causation as a kind of redistribution of energy, the effect being non-existent in the cause before the operation of the latter. It believes in the existence of Īśvara, as the Creator as well as the moral Governor of the universe. The will of Īśvara produces the universe as the tree is produced out of the seed. By a right knowledge of the padārthas, it is possible to destroy false knowledge, which is responsible for our misery and suffering, and so our *summum bonum* is emancipation from all suffering, called technically *nirāśreyas* or *apavarga* or *mokṣa*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system stands for the orthodox Realism of the Hindus, and contains a most elaborate theory of atoms and also the doctrine of inference, which will always form an extremely interesting study to a student of Greek philosophy.

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga System

Now I come to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system, another very important school of Hindu Realism. When I speak

of these systems, I do not necessarily mean the doctrines embodied in the sūtras, because as you know the sutras of some systems are very late productions, while the systematic ideas springing out of the early philosophical tradition of the Upanishads existed much earlier. For instance, some parts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system are pre-Buddhistic, while the sūtras of the Nyāya system came into existence many centuries afterwards. Similarly, as to the Sāṅkhya, there must have been other schools of this philosophy before the orthodox Sāṅkhya system came into being. And then, the Sāṅkhya sūtras were actually composed about the ninth or tenth century A.D. while the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā of Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa was in existence before 150 A.D. Some parts of the Yoga sutras are also pre-Buddhistic, while other parts were added about 150 B.C. The Yoga system is only the practical side of the Sāṅkhya, and presupposes the whole of its psychology and metaphysics, and has consequently been called the Pātañjala Sāṅkhya, after the name of its author, Patanjali. The only difference is that the Yoga believes in Īśvara as well, while the orthodox Sāṅkhya is silent on the point.

The Sāṅkhya system is ascribed to Kapila, a very ancient Rishi, who is said to have handed over the tradition to his disciple Āsuri. It also aims at emancipation, like the other orthodox systems. The world is beset with three kinds of pain (*duḥkha-traya*), and the *summum bonum* of man is to attain 'mokṣa' by the complete destruction of this pain. That is only possible by right knowledge or discrimination, since the root of all pain is ignorance. How are we to get rid of this ignorance?

By a thoroughgoing knowledge of the twenty-five tattvas or categories. These tattvas are summed up thus:

“Mūla-Prakṛtir avikṛtir mahat ādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ
sapta,
Sodaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ Puruṣaḥ.”

The first is Prakṛti, the original non-differentiated and unmanifested equilibrium of the three *gunas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The whole evolution of the universe takes place from within Prakṛti; and when dissolution takes place, there is the reverse process, the gross withdrawing itself into the subtle till the restoration of the same equilibrium, with which evolution started. The first evolute of Prakṛti is Mahat (intellect), and it is from this principle that the whole world originates. The equilibrium of the three *gunas* (primary substances) must be disturbed and one or the other *guna* predominate over the rest before the process of evolution starts on its course. In the tattva called Mahat, *sattva-guna* (intelligence-germ) predominates over the *rajas* (energy, activity) and *tamas* (mass). These *gunas* are the original stuffs of substances, and cannot be translated as qualities. You can also well understand how difficult it is to render the term Prakṛti into another language without destroying the essential meaning. It is usually translated as Matter, but that is very misleading, since as I have just told you intelligence comes out of it as the first product. Surely matter as ordinarily understood cannot create mind. Well, then, the next evolute of Prakṛti is Ahaṁkāra (ego, the ‘I’); here arises more explicit consciousness of the ‘I’ and the

'mine,' and it is produced by the three streams of sattva, rajas, and tamas, running simultaneously out of Mahat, and having each of the three *gunas* preponderate over the two others respectively. The principle Mahat is also known as Buddhi. There is a preponderance of sattva in Buddhi, as I just mentioned to you, and when this sattva is overcome by tamas, we have the *bhūtādi* state, whence are evolved the Five *Tanmātrās*, or the five subtle elements, which are the potential forces for the production of the gross elements. At the next stage are evolved the sixteen *vikāras* or modifications. These include the five perceptive organs (*buddhīndriyāṇi*), five active or conative organs (*karmendriyāṇi*), the central organ or mind (*manas*), and the five gross elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether. Here the evolution of *Prakṛti* stops. So far, I have counted twenty-four *tattvas*, and the twenty-fifth *tattva* is *Puruṣa* (Spirit or Soul), which is neither a *prakṛti* nor a *vikṛti*. When dissolution takes place, the order is reversed. The five *Mahābhūtas* are withdrawn into *Manas*, which, passing through the stages of the ten organs and the five *Tanmātrās*, withdraws itself into *Ahaṁkāra*, and that again into Buddhi or Mahat, which returns to the primary *Prakṛti*. The Yoga uses the word *citta* for buddhi or mahat of the *Sāṅkhya*. It is difficult to express their exact sense by single words in English, and we have to use mind, intelligence, or such other similar words.

To these twenty-five *tattvas* of the *Sāṅkhya*, the Yoga adds the twenty-sixth, namely, *Īśvara* (God). *Īśvara* is the supreme *Puruṣa*, who is always free, and who is never subject to ignorance and passions. His nature is

pure sattva. He is never affected by suffering, actions, and rewards. He is omniscient and omnipotent. Without His will, the process of creation out of Prakṛti would have been impossible. He is, of course, not the creator of Prakṛti, which is an eternal and independent existence. Then, again, the difference between Īśvara and Jīva is this: Īśvara is always and eternally free from all bondage and ignorance and suffering, but Jīva has to tear asunder the bondage of the three kinds of suffering before he is emancipated. This is purely the standpoint of the Yoga, as in the Sāṅkhya there is no reference to Īśvara.

Now we come to the very knotty problem as to how or with what motive does the whole evolutionary process begin? In other words, what is the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti? The Sāṅkhya is a dualistic system, believing in the existence of these two principles, which are mutually unconnected. How does Puruṣa come in contact with Prakṛti at all? Is such relation between the two real or not? What is the genesis of their mutual relation, if any? This question is perfectly relevant and quite natural, since Puruṣa is supposed to be pure intelligence, and it is difficult to imagine how Prakṛti could come into any relation with it. Puruṣa again is not an agent (kartā) with reference to any activity, but is only an enjoyer (bhoktā). In reply it is pointed out that when Puruṣa looks at Prakṛti, the equilibrium of the three guṇas is disturbed, and the intelligence of Puruṣa is reflected in buddhi, with the consequence that the non-intelligent transformations of buddhi appear as if intelligent. Puruṣa is then deluded

into thinking that the transformations of Prakṛti through buddhi are its own. This is how this ignorance (avidyā) on the part of Puruṣa starts, and it marks the beginning of his bondage and suffering. Avidyā is the root of all suffering, and under its influence Puruṣa unites with Prakṛti, in so far as he considers the modifications of buddhi its own.

Puruṣa, not being an agent, is like a lame man who cannot walk, but can direct the blind Prakṛti as to which way to go. Creation results from this kind of union of the lame (pangu) and the blind (andha). So long as this association of Puruṣa with buddhi continues, there is sorrow and bondage. In order to eradicate sorrow Puruṣa must somehow return to its original mood, the consciousness that it is not associated with buddhi, that the dharmas of Prakṛti are not its own but quite alien to it. When such true discrimination is aroused, the whole standpoint is changed; buddhi is seen to have had no relation or association with Puruṣa; Prakṛti turns away from Puruṣa, whose ignorance is then destroyed, hence with it all sorrow is wiped out, and Puruṣa rediscovers its true nature, as pure and liberated. The whole evolution, the whole creation, births and deaths, all come to a stop immediately on the awakening of such knowledge. Prakṛti's function having been fulfilled with the liberation of Puruṣa, she retires from the scene of her activity, like an actress who retires after the exhibition of her whole skill on the stage. Each puruṣa has to secure its emancipation in this manner. When one soul is thus liberated, it is only for that one that Prakṛti ceases; other souls must similarly traverse the

same path and attain freedom from sorrow. Hence the Sāṅkhya believes in a plurality of puruṣas. There is an infinite number of souls. If there were only one soul, then if one is in sorrow or bondage, all must be in sorrow or bondage; and if one is liberated, all must be liberated; but that cannot be. The souls are, therefore, many and not one. On this point, there is a distinct disagreement of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta. According to the Vedānta, the one soul appears as many through māyā; in reality there is only one soul; and bondage and liberation are valid only within māyā or avidyā; hence there is no difficulty on that account. But the realism of the Sāṅkhya is not in agreement with that standpoint and holds a real plurality of puruṣas or souls.

Now let me revert for a moment to the doctrine of causation. The Sāṅkhya doctrine is called Satkāryavāda, that is, the effect (kārya) is existent (sat) in the cause; that existence cannot be derived out of non-existence; that causation is a process which makes a quality manifest, but does not produce it out of nothing. The quality existed there already in an unmanifested or potential state, and the operation of cause transforms itself into a different form or manifestation. As there is an actual transformation of the cause into the effect, like that of milk into curd, this theory is also known as Parināmovāda ('parināma' means transformation) to distinguish it from the Vedantic theory of Vivartavāda, according to which the cause is not actually transformed into the effect, but only appears to be so, just as a rope is not transformed into a snake, but only appears so for

some time. The Sāṅkhya doctrine is enunciated in the oft-quoted śloka of the Bhagavadgītā:

“Na asato vidyate bhāvo
Na abhavo vidyate satah.”

This simply means, as I have just told you, that sat cannot come out of asat, neither can sat (being) ever become asat (non-being). Thus, a jar potentially exists in the clay, a statue in the stone, a necklace in gold or silver, curd in the milk, and so on. The effect is simply the cause revealed, and the cause is the effect concealed. Cause and effect are identical.

I shall now point out very briefly the special features of the Yoga, which accepts the whole Sāṅkhya philosophy as its basis, with the difference that it posits an Īśvara, whose Will guides the course of Prakṛti's evolution with respect to each individual soul according to his saṃskāras and karma of the previous lives—blind Prakṛti alone cannot start its evolutionary course by itself. Prakṛti is blind and Puruṣa is lame, according to the Sāṅkhya; but the Yoga brings in the idea of God to solve this radical difficulty. Besides, the Yoga offers a practical science, points to a practical way by which the soul may be liberated. It holds that knowledge alone is not enough to bring about Puruṣa's liberation. What is required is a complete purging of buddhi. All kinds of saṃskāras cling to buddhi from past lives, and unless and until they are uprooted, emancipation is impossible. These saṃskāras must be completely destroyed, and that is only possible by means of the practical discipline as is shown in the Yoga system. Our intelligent life finds

expression in many inclinations or processes. These are called the *vṛttis* of the *citta*. There are five such *vṛttis* or mental impulses, and Yoga simply means the restraining of all these *citta-vṛttis*. These *vṛttis* are naturally leading us outwards to the worldly life, which brings pain in its train. We must, therefore, turn them inwards by meditation, so that the energy wasted in their external play may be stored up and centralised within the mind. Yoga has been seriously practised in India for ages, and even to this day there are to be found here and there people who are on the way to Yoga. For a Yogi, no miracles are impossible, though he does not care to perform them. The path to Yoga is the most difficult one, and consequently very few can, in the present environments, succeed in carrying it through.

Now, there are eight accessories (*angas*) of Yoga. Without them Yoga cannot be accomplished. These are Yama (self control), Niyama (mental disciplines), Āsana (meditative posture), Prāṇāyāma (breathing exercises), Pratyāhāra (withdrawing the senses), Dhāraṇā (mental fixation), Dhyāna (meditation), and Samādhi (complete mental immobility or concentration). The first stage requires you to begin purging the mind of all impurities and bad *samskāras* clinging to it through many lives. This is accomplished by refraining from destroying life (*ahimsā*), taking up the vow of truthfulness (*satya*), refraining from committing theft (*āsteya*), sexual continence (*brahmacarya*), and a spirit of renunciation (*aparigraha*). These five virtues constitute Yama. The second accessory is Niyama, and it requires you to measure your thoughts,

words and actions, to develop the habit of silence which always contributes to spiritual development, to study philosophy and to fix your mind on Īśvara. These are the Niyamas. Then you must learn the proper postures in which to sit for meditation. Then you have to learn how to control your breath (*prāṇa*). You first breathe in through the left nostril, then close both the nostrils and retain the breath for sixteen seconds, then breathe out from the right nostril slowly. Then reverse the order. In this way, with increasing practice you gradually acquire power to hold your breath steady for a considerably long time. This gives a new vitality to your whole body, and makes you more and more impervious to external distractions. I remember many years ago we persuaded a Yogi to be so good as to honour us with a visit. When he came, my father 'philosophised' with him in Sanskrit, and afterwards requested him to give us any concrete indication of his power of Yoga. The Yogi consented, and at once began to practise some special *prāṇāyāma* exercises, and after a few minutes, with sudden jerks he was able to lift himself from the ground just by an inch or two. This was done by the force of *prāṇa* alone. Very much more is possible by Yoga, but I have mentioned this incident because I have a distinct personal recollection of it, and it is not based on mere hearsay.

After *prāṇāyāma*, you must withdraw the senses completely and fix your mind on any object. The student of Yoga starts with fixing his steady gaze on the tip of the nose. After all this is done in the proper manner, you attain to *Samādhi*, which is a kind of trance, in

which you completely lose all consciousness of the external world. It is in Samādhi that you realise your unity with Īśvara. There are actual records by European eye-witnesses to the samādhi of certain Yogis continuing for months and months at a stretch. During this period they continue in the same immovable posture and hibernate. They can be buried in the earth and taken out after many months in the same trance and then when the samādhi ceases they return to a consciousness of the world. I have no time to enter into any concrete cases of Yogis and to discuss this system in any detail. I have presented to you its main outlines very briefly, along with its difference from the Sāṅkhya. Time does not permit me to describe the four kinds of Yoga, Mantrayoga, Layayoga, Haṭhayoga, and Rājayoga. Yoga is also used in a more general sense, implying the performance of one's duty in the best way (karmasu kauśalam), and a householder can be a Yogi in sooth. Only Yama and Niyama are, as a rule, sufficient for the majority of people to qualify themselves for a milder kind of Yoga. Yoga is more of an art than a philosophy. It is the practical discipline based on the Sāṅkhya philosophy.

The Mimāṃsā System

Before I proceed to discuss the essential doctrines of the Vedānta, I shall very briefly refer to another school, known as the Karmamīmāṃsā or Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini, since it is counted among the orthodox systems of philosophy, although as an elaborate exposition of the Vedic rituals its philosophic portion may be viewed

as of a secondary importance, and this would weaken its claims as a system of philosophy. In fact, the Vedānta is also known as Uttara-mimāṃsā, as it deals with the uttara portion of the Vedas, the purva portion being mere ritualism.

The Mimāṃsā sūtras of Jaimini are old enough, and are supposed to have been written about 200 B.C. A commentary on these sutras was written by Śābara about a hundred and fifty years after, and it was further commented upon by Prabhākara, a pupil of Kumārila Bhatta, believed to be a contemporary of Śaṅkara, and older by a few years.

Jaimini recognises six *pramāṇas*, Perception (*pratyakṣa*), Inference (*anumāna*), Analogy (*upamāna*), Presumption (*arthāpatti*), Testimony (*śabda*), and Non-existence (*abhāva*). All knowledge is self-illuminating, and is self-valid or self-evident at the time of its production. What is true now may become invalid later on with the rise of other data, but as such all knowledge is true as it arises. Knowledge is not produced by external things, which have no validity, since they are known to us through knowledge alone, and it is knowledge which illumines them. Our knowledge is the criterion of the truth of objective reality. Knowledge also reveals the existence of the self, the knower.

The Vedas are eternal revelation. By a knowledge of the canons for the right interpretation of Vedic texts, and the right performance of rituals, sacrifices, etc., one goes to heaven, and that is *mukti*. Thus there is salvation through karma, and so this system is also called

Karmamīmāṃsā. This system believes not only in the eternity of the Vedic knowledge, but also in the eternity of the Vedic texts. The Veda is the *Śabda-pramāṇa par excellence*. Whether we understand the meaning of words or not, the fact is that all words, as combinations of letters, have an inherent and eternal meaning. This system believes in the existence of souls, since without them the injunctions about the performance of sacrifices would remain a dead letter; there must be somebody to perform the sacrifices. There is a plurality of souls, as in the Sāṅkhya; they are all-pervading, but many different souls, each separately responsible for its own good or bad deeds. Salvation means the enjoyment of the fruits of the past karma, and exhausting all stored-up karma, and stopping the generation of any fresh karma. There is no God. The universe was never created by any God. It is impossible to ascribe any motive for the supposed God's creative activity. The universe is neither created nor destroyed, but is an eternal continuum. This is the Mimāṃsā philosophy in a nut-shell.

The Vedānta System

Now I come to the Vedānta, the most important school of eastern thought, which has met with the most welcome reception and the most genuine appreciation by some of the leading western savants of the last century. I have already overstepped the limitations of the time at my disposal, and consequently can now give you only a very brief exposition of the fundamental thoughts of this system, with which I have identified

myself for many years past, and which has come down to me as a family tradition for several generations. When we speak of the Vedānta, we usually mean the school of the great Śaṅkara (788-820 A.D.), who wrote his epoch-making commentary (called *Śārīrakabhāṣya*) on the Brahma-sutras of Bādarāyana (about second century B.C.), although there are three other systems within the Vedānta itself, of which the one that possesses any real importance is that of Rāmānuja (12th century A.D.). Śaṅkara received the Vedantic tradition from his preceptor, Govinda, who was the disciple of Gaudapāda, who expounded a rigorous monistic doctrine, based on the Upanishads, in his commentary on the Māndūkya Upanishad. This standpoint was later on developed by Śaṅkara.

According to Śaṅkara, our *summum bonum* is the attainment of mokṣa, a state of absolute bliss, which is to be secured by means of true knowledge alone. All our empirical knowledge is based on an illusion, on *adhyāsa*, which is due to the transference of things and relations of the objective world to the inner soul. The self and the not-self are to each other as light and darkness. The being and qualities of the one are quite incompatible with the being and qualities of the other. But in our experience we always transfer their mutual dharmas. This must, therefore, be a false superimposition or *avidyā* or *adhyāsa*. This *avidyā* is with us inborn, otherwise we should never say 'this is mine,' 'that is thine,' etc. This innate *avidyā* is the root of all our erroneous knowledge and the consequent activity. The moment you switch on light, all darkness

in the room disappears, similarly on the awakening of right knowledge all ignorance (*avidyā*) is destroyed, and the true nature of reality is re-discovered as it always was. All our bondage and suffering is therefore due to *avidyā*, and it is *vidyā* or *jñāna* alone which can annihilate *avidyā*.

What is *avidyā* in the case of the individual may be called *māyā* in the case of the world as a whole, a kind of cosmic illusion. The whole world is then *māyā*, that is, it appears to be what it is actually not. In reality, there is only *one* Reality, and that is Brahman. Everything other than Brahman is false. In fact, there is nothing other than Brahman. The world appears to have a separate and independent reality of its own, but as I have just said that is due to *avidyā*; the world is only phenomenally real, metaphysically it has no reality and is identical with the only existence. The Vedānta, therefore, allows the world an empirical reality, in the same way as Kant spoke of the distinction between the empirically real and transcendently ideal. Space and Time have an empirical reality, but they are transcendently ideal. In the same way, Śaṅkara speaks of the world as possessing an empirical reality, and on that basis, so long as true knowledge has not arisen, all duties are valid, all the śāstras are valid, all distinctions are real; but when such knowledge arises, the point of view is at once changed, all differences disappear in the vast distinctionless ocean of the only Reality, and then alone one discovers one's true nature (*svarūpa*).

These thoughts are embodied in what is known as the doctrine of *Māyā*, which is the central thought of Śan-

kara's Vedānta. The Sāṅkhya Prakṛti is viewed as Māyā in the Vedānta. Prakṛti is real, but Māyā is only an appearance. It is altogether impossible to define Māyā. It is existent (sat) as well as non-existent (asat) ; hence it is spoken of as something indeterminate (anirvacanīyā). Originally, it was a mysterious power of God, but in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara it has a definite meaning of 'appearance.'

Now let us apply this thought to the problems of the relation of God to the world, and of God to man. God is Brahman, and is without any qualities (nirguna). The problem of relation does not arise, because when there is only one existence, how could it be related? But, as I have just told you, it is Māyā which makes the One Brahman *appear* as many. Brahman is really identical with Ātman. But so long as the ātman is under the spell of avidyā, it imagines its separation from Brahman, and acts accordingly. Thus the relation between Brahman (the Universal Self) and Ātman (the individual self) is only possible within avidyā or māyā. Ātman is one, but appears as many by māyā. This is the answer of the Vedānta to the idea of the plurality of souls in the Sāṅkhya. The souls, according to the Vedānta, are not separate and real as individuals. The sense of their mutual separation is entirely due to avidyā. There is no actual division of the One into the many. By a false angle of vision, the One appears as many. The plurality of the many is therefore false. The world appears as the many so long as our avidyā continues, but all plurality disappears with the awakening of true knowledge. I need not amplify any further

the doctrine of the Ātman, as I have already discussed it while speaking of the Upanishads.

Now, it is impossible to define Brahman. You can only define the māyā-aspect of Brahman, when He can be spoken of as the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of the universe. But if you do want the nearest definition of the true aspect of Reality, Brahman in itself, we can only say that Brahman is Existence (Sat), Knowledge or Intelligence (Cit), and Bliss (Ānanda). These are not the qualities of Brahman, since Brahman has no qualities. Thus, like Spinoza, the Vedānta would not speak of the existence of Brahman, since existence *is* Brahman. The same applies to the other two aspects of cit and ānanda.

Liberation is not possible by karma, since mokṣa is in no sense an accomplishment requiring activity. It is only the discovery of Truth, which is self-illuminating. When you enter a dark room you imagine a snake curled up on the floor, and you are at once overtaken by the emotion of fear. But all your fear is gone when you discover that it was merely a rope and not a snake. Now the point is that the rope was never actually transformed into snake, but was all through a rope and nothing else. It is your avidyā which led you to the false supposition of a snake. That false supposition is our adhyāsa, which causes our bondage. When the world is understood to be māyā, you should be able to understand the transcendental point of view, according to which there is no bondage, no liberation, no world, nothing at all. These are not realities, hence if we are not really bound there is no meaning in our liberation:

the ātman is always free, 'it only appeared as bound while under the influence of avidyā. This great truth is not easy to grasp, but it is the very limit of our philosophy, as far as thought can lead us. Śaṅkara's Vedānta is a rigorous and absolute Monism. Its characteristic merit lies in the recognition of the distinction between the vyāvahārika, or empirical, and pāramārthika, or transcendental, aspects of reality. From the latter point of view, creation and dissolution are myths. Yet, from the empirical standpoint there is no harm in speaking of creation, etc. In that aspect, Brahman is both the efficient as well as material cause of the universe. The Creator aspect of Brahman creates the world by his Will, and is guided by our karma in assigning us our stations in life. It is impossible to pry into the motive behind all this creation. The causality of the world is a problem whose validity is questioned on the ground that as causality applies to phenomena alone, you cannot take a jump as it were outside the phenomena and put the question as to the origin of the phenomenal world. The world has no beginning in time, and the only thing that we can say as to the motive of creation is that it is the sport of the Lord and nothing more; it is his līlā. Any more pointed assumption will be absolutely futile to make.

The Vedānta accepts the six Pramāṇas of the Mīmāṃsakas. This subject is treated at length in some of the later works on the Vedānta. It also holds the doctrine of the identity of cause and effect. Śaṅkara establishes his own standpoint in his commentary on the first four sūtras of the Brahma-sūtras, and then begins his

polemic against the other systems. In the second chapter of his *Śārīrakabhāṣya* he undertakes a critical refutation of almost all the other systems.

There was another school of the Vedānta, which was much less rigorous than Śaṅkara's Advaita-vāda, represented by Rāmānuja, who was one of the chief founders of the Vaisnavite school, and lived in the twelfth century. His system of the Vedānta is known as Viśiṣṭādvaita, a qualified monism. He held that Brahman is not without qualities, but is possessed of auspicious qualities, like intelligence, power, mercy, love, etc., and that the souls have a distinctly independent reality of their own; they never merge into Brahman, as Śaṅkara held. They always keep up their individuality. Rāmānuja believed in a triplicity of reality, God (a personal God, called Hari or Viṣṇu), soul, the thinking principle (cit) and matter, the unthinking principle (acit). The two principles of cit and acit constitute the world, which as the manifestation of God may be spoken of as the body of God. God is the inner principle (antaryāmin) of the whole creation, and is also the author of creation. The conception of Māyā is criticised as superfluous and meaningless. The world is a reality and not a phenomenon or appearance. We must worship Brahman, the creator and ruler and sustainer of the world. God is love, and we must worship him to secure his favours. Thus the distinction between the transcendental and the real, the nirguṇa and saguṇa Brahman, is abolished in Rāmānuja, and a theistic colour is imparted to the ancient texts of the Upanishads to substantiate his theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Most people in India are

followers of the Vedānta, and amongst those by far the largest majority are associated with the school of Śaṅkara.

The two other schools of the Vedānta are the systems of Madhva and Vallabha. Madhva's is a dualistic doctrine, called the Dvaitādvaita. He believes duality is an ultimate principle. Never can man and God merge into each other. They shall always be separate. The individual is only a servant or slave of the Supreme Lord, and must worship Him in obedience. Māyā is nothing but the Will of the Lord (Viṣṇu), whose favour and grace we should seek by acquiring a knowledge of His excellence and not by a knowledge of non-duality, which is a sheer myth. The world is a reality. It is the manifestation of Viṣṇu. This doctrine appeared as Madhva's system in the thirteenth century.

In the fifteenth century lived another exponent of the Vedānta, called Vallabha. His school is known as Viśuddhādvaita. This was another non-ascetic realistic school within the Vedānta, Śaṅkara explains the universe as māyā, Rāmānuja explains it as the body of Brahman, Madhva views it as the manifestation of Viṣṇu's body, and Vallabha takes it as the āvirbhāva (manifestation) and tirobhāva (disappearance) of the Lord Kṛṣṇa.

This closes the discussion of our subject. I have endeavoured to place before you in a brief way the main ideas of the various systems of eastern philosophy with their background, the philosophy of the Upanishads. You have seen in the Cārvāka system a typical instance of Materialism with all its attendant heresies; you have

had some exposition of the two unorthodox systems with their peculiar and interesting theories; you have also been put in touch with the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy in their mutual relations; and these, as you have seen, represent both the realistic and idealistic currents of thought; in particular, you have had an idea of the practical discipline taught by the Yoga, the like of which you find nowhere else. All this should convince you of the great importance of a study of the eastern systems. You will find that your study, if undertaken in a sympathetic spirit, will be amply repaid in giving you that breadth of view and that elasticity of thought which are the *sine qua non* of a genuine and true student of philosophy. I am gratified to find the subject of Eastern Philosophy occupying that position of importance in the deliberations of this Conference which it certainly deserves. Professor Brett, who has been sympathetically disposed to a close study of eastern philosophy since he was in India, has already given you an extremely interesting and sound exposition of the development of the psychological thought of the East and has assigned it a place of importance in his great work, the "History of Psychology." I shall consider my coming over to Canada and taking part in this Philosophical Conference to be useful only if I can, by this brief exposition of eastern thought, give a fresh impetus to your philosophical activities in the field of international philosophy. It is that spirit of internationalism that I advocate, and it is my greatest wish to help in my own humble way in creating a genuine atmosphere for a cultural union of the East and the West. I

can think of no better way of finishing my lecture than to quote to you the last couplet of the *Rgveda*, which seems to me the most ancient gospel of internationalism:

“Sam gacchadhvam sam vadadhvam
ṣam vo manāmsi jānatām.”

“O ye people! walk together, speak together, and know one another’s mind.”

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